

# BRICS PERSPECTIVE

Volume 1 | Issue 1 (Dec 2024) e - ISSN:



*A Journal for Strategic Analysis and Policy Relevance*



# **BRICS PERSPECTIVE**

## *A Journal for Strategic Analysis and Policy Relevance*

### **CHIEF PATRON**

Dr. Aseem K. Chauhan  
Chancellor, Amity University Haryana

### **PATRON**

Prof. (Dr.) P.B. Sharma  
Vice Chancellor, Amity University Haryana

### **Co-PATRON and Editor in-Chief**

Prof. (Dr) Vikas Madhukar  
Pro Vice Chancellor, Amity University Haryana  
Director, Amity Centre for BRICS Studies

### **EDITORIAL TEAM**

#### **Managing Editor**

Dr. K Mansi  
Assistant Professor and Coordinator,  
Amity Centre for BRICS Studies, Amity University Haryana

#### **Dr. Shipra Shukla (Associate Editor)**

Assistant Professor  
Amity School of Liberal Arts, Amity University Haryana

#### **Dr. Parijat Bhattacharjee**

Assistant Professor (Russian)  
Amity School of Languages  
Amity University Haryana

#### **Dr. Suvro Parui**

Associate Professor (Chinese)  
Amity School of Languages  
Amity University Haryana

#### **Ayanangsha Maitra**

Journalist and Research Coordinator,  
Centre for Geoeconomic in Global South, Delhi

#### **Dr Raj Kumar Sharma,**

Senior Research Fellow, NatStrat. Delhi

## **ADVISORY BOARD**

**Dr. Anna Kireenko**, Director of Baikal School of BRICS, Russia

**Dr. Marta Fernandez**, Director, BRICS Policy Centre, Brazil

**Dr. Wellington Dantas de Amorim**, Brazilian Defense College, Brazil

**Dr. Juan Roberto Reyes Solis**, Anahuac University, Mexico

**Dr Hugh Tuckfield**, Director, Indo-Pacific Studies Center, Australia

**Prof. Jagannath Panda**, Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA), Sweden

**Prof. Nnanna Arukwe**, University of Nigeria, Nigeria

**Amb. Anil Trigunayat**, Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, India

## *From the desk of Editor-in-Chief*

It is with great pleasure and a profound sense of pride that I introduce the *BRICS Perspective: a Journal of Strategic Analysis and Policy Relevance*, a bi-annual publication of Amity Centre for BRICS Studies, that reflects the dynamic evolution of the BRICS nations; Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and their growing significance in the global political and economic landscape, as evident from its expansion since 2023.

The Amity Centre for BRICS Studies, which I have the privilege of heading, was established by our Hon'ble Chancellor Dr. Aseem Chauhan on February 10, 2011, at Amity University Haryana, with a clear vision to position itself as a Centre of Excellence dedicated to the research, knowledge creation, and dissemination of critical insights on the BRICS grouping. At the time of its inception, when the BRICS bloc was still in nascent stages, Hon'ble Chancellor envisioned its immense potential to reshape the global order. His foresight has since borne fruit, as BRICS has evolved into one of the most influential and strategically important alliances of the 21st century, and so has the Centre for BRICS Studies. It embarks on an endeavour to establish itself as a leading voice on BRICS matter in India.

In line with our mission, we have worked tirelessly to build strong partnerships with BRICS countries, diplomatic circles, think tanks, academic institutions, strategic community and research organizations. This is evident by the presence of eminent experts on the Centre's Advisory Board, the various MoU we signed, like the one with the TV BRICS media network, the delegation visits from various BRICS countries. The aim is to facilitate dialogue on different planes, and consequently, foster cooperation and collaboration. This collaborative approach has enabled us to make meaningful contributions to the understanding of the opportunities and challenges that BRICS presents, not only to its member states but also to the world at large.

The pages of *BRICS Perspective* capture the essence of this evolving partnership, exploring key themes such as economic cooperation, trade, investment, environment, innovation and geopolitics within the BRICS framework. This publication serves as a valuable resource for those seeking to understand the intricately intertwined dynamics of the BRICS countries and the growing interdependencies between them.

As we continue to navigate an increasingly multipolar world, the Amity Centre for BRICS Studies remains committed to advancing research and fostering dialogue that supports the development of inclusive, sustainable, and transformative policies for the BRICS nations and the global community. I am confident that this magazine will offer valuable insights into the shared aspirations of the BRICS countries and their collective journey towards greater economic integration, innovation, and global influence.

I extend my heartfelt congratulations to the editorial team for their hard work and dedication in bringing this issue to fruition. I trust that the readers will find it both insightful and inspiring as we collectively look towards a future of greater collaboration and shared success within the BRICS framework.

**Prof. Vikas Madhukar**

## INDEX

**INTRODUCTION: The Saliency of BRICS+: Expanding Influence or Fragmented Unity?**  
*Dr. Mansi*, Amity Centre for BRICS Studies, Amity University Haryana

1. **Russian Perspective on BRICS and India–Russia Relations**  
*H.E. Mr. Roman Babushkin*, Deputy Chief of Mission, Russian Embassy in India  
(Special Lecture at Amity University Haryana)
2. **The BRICS+5 Debate: Chaos or Cohesion?**  
*Dr. Hugh Tuckfield*, Director, Indo-Pacific Studies Centre, Australia
3. **The Emerging Role of BRICS: Shaping Global Security and Peacebuilding**  
*Mr. Samir Bhattacharya*, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)
4. **Russia in BRICS: Pioneering Partnerships for Global Stability**  
*Mr. Otabek Khomidov*, Amity University Haryana
5. **Neo-Nazis and the Russia–Ukraine Crisis: A Genuine Concern or Mere Consternation?**  
*Mr. Aniket Vaibhav*, Amity University Haryana
6. **State vs. Mind: Can Confucian Ideology Enrich China’s Foreign Policy?**  
*Dr. S. Parui*, Amity University Haryana
7. **India–México Partnership: Challenges and Barriers in BRICS Engagement**  
*Prof. Juan Roberto Reyes Solís*, Universidad Anáhuac Querétaro, Mexico
8. **India–Brazil Ties: Before BRICS and Beyond**  
*Dr. Rishu Sharma*, Amity University Haryana
9. **Evaluating BRICS’ Stance on Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Environmental Cooperation**  
*Dr. Luxita Sharma*, Amity University Haryana
10. **EXPERT INTERVIEW: Dr. Krzysztof Iwanek, Indologist, Poland**

## INTRODUCTION

Dr K Mansi<sup>1</sup>

The 16th BRICS Summit held at Kazan, Russia, demonstrated significant diplomatic success. It was the first Summit after the BRICS expansion, and it formally inducted four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and United Arab Emirates. It also accepted 13 more countries as new “partner nations”. The Summit was attended by more than 30 countries and some 40 countries have expressed their interest in joining this non-WEST group.

The group has emerged as a geopolitical and geostrategic group of the Global South, aiming to reform the US-led-dollar-dominated global governance system, particularly in the context of trade, finance, and security. The BRICS countries remain united in their desire to reform global institutions and strengthen cooperation among the Global South, but translating these broad objectives into concrete actions will require ongoing efforts to navigate internal divisions and external pressures.

The BRICS, an intergovernmental organization comprising of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, was founded in 2009 as a platform for emerging economies in response to the existing US led Western financial and economic architecture. In a first, the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa (2023) formally invited six countries to join the group, effective January 1, 2024. The expanded BRICS, now called the BRICS plus include 9 prominent economies from the global south. As such, BRICS+ now represents around 45 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of global trade, 40 percent of global oil production, 28 percent of the world’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and more than one-third of global GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.

The geopolitical and geoeconomic prominence of BRICS is poised to increase. As a growing economic and geopolitical force BRICS advocates for a more equitable global system. By diversifying its membership, building alternative financial institutions, and acting as a counterbalance to Western power, BRICS is likely to continue playing a pivotal role in shaping the future of global governance, international trade, and geopolitical alignment. In this context, the *Business in BRICS Magazine* take this unique initiative to bring together scholars from diverse background to discuss multifaceted dimensions of the BRICS nations, encompassing political, economic, cultural, and linguistic aspects. This interdisciplinary publication seeks to bridge academic insights across various fields to provide a comprehensive examination of critical issues pertinent to the BRICS group. With a focus on pragmatic scholarship, the magazine aspires to offer in-depth analyses to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the challenges and opportunities BRICS faces in the contemporary global context.

---

<sup>1</sup> Assistant Professor and Coordinator, Amity Centre for BRICS Studies, Amity University Haryana

The current issue is compilation of contributions from 10 experts representing the diplomatic community, academia, and the media. The content of this issue can be broadly classified into three distinct categories: diplomatic discourse, scholarly analysis, and expert perspectives. The issue begins with the remarks delivered by H. E. Mr. Roman Babushkin, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Russian Embassy in India, during his visit to the Amity Centre for BRICS Studies. His address focused on the Russian position on vital global developments as well as modern trends in the Russia-India special and privileged strategic partnership.

Following the discussion initiated by H. E. Mr. Roman Babushkin, the subsequent four papers—authored by Dr. Hugh Tuckfield, Mr. Samir Bhattacharya, Mr. Otabek Khomidov and Mr. Aniket Vaibhav—examine various geopolitical dimensions of BRICS and BRICS Plus. These papers address key questions, including whether the expansion of BRICS will foster cohesion or contribute to fragmentation; the role of BRICS in shaping global security and peacebuilding efforts; and how Russia's participation in BRICS contributes to fostering global stability. Additionally, the experts explore how BRICS facilitates inter-group relations, particularly between India and Russia, in the context of a multipolar world, and analyze the impact of the "war of narratives" on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Dr. Suvro Parui, a specialist on China, explores the influence of Confucian ideology on China's foreign policy. Prof. Juan Roberto Reyes Solís and Dr. Rishu Sharma, two prominent scholars on Latin America, offer insightful and original analyses of India's bilateral ties with Mexico and Brazil within the broader framework of BRICS. Their individual contributions provide a detailed and nuanced perspective on how these relationships align with and influence the larger dynamics of the BRICS grouping. In tandem with the interdisciplinary nature of this magazine, Dr. Luxita Sharma offers a concise analysis of the environmental aspects of BRICS. Her evaluation explores the group's stance on climate change, sustainable development, and environmental cooperation,

The final section of this issue features an insightful interview with distinguished experts. For this issue, we interviewed Dr. Krzysztof Iwanek, a renowned Polish Indologist. He offered invaluable perspectives on BRICS, drawing from his extensive scholarly contributions.

The broader objective of this issue is to provide a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the issues surrounding BRICS, contributing to the broader strategic thinking vis-à-vis BRICS. The discussions presented in this issue aim not only to inform but also to stimulate meaningful engagement with the core issues of BRICS, while encouraging the initiation of deliberations focused on advancing the BRICS agenda.

## Russian Perspective on BRICS and India–Russia Relations<sup>1</sup>

I am truly privileged to be invited to the well-reputed Amity University Haryana to discuss prospects of Russia-India cooperation. I will take this unique opportunity to give you a sense of the Russian position on vital global developments as well as modern trends in the Russia-India special and privileged strategic partnership, which gets growing significance in the current irreversible transition to a polycentric paradigm and brings us more confidence to deal with an extremely turbulent scenario.



**His Excellency Roman Babushkin**  
Deputy Chief of Mission,  
Embassy of Russian Federation in India

To a large extent behind it is a fact that the US and the West, whose economic dominance is objectively challenged by the emerging independent centers of power, by all means want to retain their control over global affairs. Quite typical became their neo-colonial practice of double-standards based disrespect for international law and the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereign equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs. Hot spots like Middle East and Ukraine crises are merely elements of a more intricate dynamic that, like a mosaic, encompasses a vast array of elements and factors shaping the new reality. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, it is followed by the combination of the decades-nurtured tools of unlawful competition through unilateral sanctions and artificial disruption of supply chains, regime-change policy and other proxy-war instruments, including massive disinformation campaigns, under pretexts of non-compliance with Western-style neo-liberal standards. Imposing confrontation and divide-and-rule tactics are clearly aimed to contain the development of others with absolutely no care about their interests. Cooperation in that scenario hugely becomes politically conditioned.

Russia not only withstood external challenges but is also actively laying a solid foundation to advance its strategic plans for economic development, setting ambitious yet achievable goals in demographics and healthcare, education and youth development along with clear objectives to strengthen technological sovereignty. Even Western experts are starting to grasp the futility of anti-Russian sanctions, which have proven counterproductive – not only failing to harm Russia but causing substantial damage on those imposing them. Sanctions don't solve problems rather compromise to a huge extent their initiators as unreliable and untrustworthy partners. Russia ranks as the world's fifth-largest economy with the goal to become the fourth one by 2030. Despite over 17,000 sanctions, Russia's GDP grew by 3,6% last year. Furthermore, we are steadily building strong ties with friendly nations, both bilaterally and through organizations like the EAEU, BRICS and the SCO.

This new phase is characterized by the increasing influence of countries from the Global South and the Global East, which we now refer to as the Global Majority. These nations are asserting their sovereignty and prioritizing national interests over external influences, including by more extensive coordination in multilateral platforms focusing to ensure their equal access to financial and technological resources and boost legitimate development partnerships.

---

<sup>1</sup> Special Lecture at Amity University Haryana, May 10, 2024.

A glaring example of how diverse countries can cooperate across various sectors, respecting mutual interests and reaching consensus without coercion is **BRICS**. This cooperative spirit is attracting more nations, doubling the Association's membership and expanding its influence in global governance. The Russian presidency in 2024 under the motto "Strengthening Multilateralism for Equitable Global Development and Security" prioritizes a robust agenda covering such domains as policy and security, economy and finance, humanitarian and cultural spheres. Key priorities include seamless integration of new members into the BRICS eco-system, enhancing the democratization of the international relations as well as strengthening ties with developing nations through "outreach" and "BRICS+" formats.

As we stand a third of the way through our term, comprising of overall more than 200 events, it is safe to state that our collaboration in the expanded format has gained full momentum. The BRICS Summit will take place in Kazan in October.

The importance of BRICS in the current environment is growing as it offers cooperation alternatives to be independent from illegal unilateral restrictions. In this regard our financial track is of paramount significance. Along with the promotion of the NBD-sponsored infrastructure projects, we are exploring new reliable payment mechanisms to facilitate the use of national currencies.

Through the implementation of the BRICS Economic Partnership Programme we enhance e-commerce and synchronization of trade and customs regulations. Traditionally strong is our dialogue in the areas of healthcare, food and energy security. In terms of innovation, we cooperate through the BRICS Technology Transfer Network and the BRICS Network facilitating contacts among scientific and higher education institutions. We aim to elevate our discussions in digital education and expand the capacity of the BRICS Network University. On artificial intelligence, our objective is to establish premier platforms that set the highest standards globally. In February in Moscow, we initiated the BRICS Nuclear Medicine Working Group.

Furthermore, the cultural, sports, and youth exchanges under our chairmanship are vibrant and dynamic. Events like the BRICS Sports Games, Youth Forum and others provide plenty of new opportunities to the creative energies within our union.

BRICS has earned its reputation globally for its coherent strive for just and equal multipolarity that becomes vital for the member-states and provides a great scope for coordination. Along with traditional Foreign Ministers and National Security Advisors tracks designed to expand mutual understanding and elaborate on a common response to the global and regional issues as well as new challenges and threats, it has got very instrumental to push forward the development agenda. Indicative was the support of the Global South countries, including BRICS states, of the initiatives of the Indian presidency in G20 in 2023 with due credit to be awarded to the Indian team who managed to prevent "Ukrainization" of the forum and bring its focus back to the pressing economic issues relevant for the developing world.

When it comes to the **Ukrainian crisis**, which at the current stage became a watershed moment in the Western crusade against Russia in the post-cold war history, it gets absolutely clear that the Global majority, including India, doesn't buy the Western Russophobic narratives around it. Ukraine has been positioned strategically as both a tool and a battleground, from which aggressive actions against Russia are coordinated in order to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, remove it as economic competitor as well as strongest advocate of equal multipolarity and traditional values.

The majority of combat operations against Russia are nurtured by Western finances and armaments, including prohibited depleted uranium munitions and cluster bombs. Above all, some hotheads are even contemplating the deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine, being fully aware that such a move would lead to a direct confrontation with Russia with unpredictable escalation and consequences.

Since the onset of the Russian Special Military Operation, Western support to Kiev has exceeded \$230 billion – a stark contrast to the modest \$4 billion in humanitarian aid for the entire African continent in 2023. The April decision of the US Congress approving new financial aid to Ukraine confirms that the US doesn't seek any peaceful solution. Symptomatically, the White House wants for the Ukrainian armed forces to hold out at least until the November US presidential voting without damaging Biden's image.

Considering this, we confirm that Washington's actions as an active party to the conflict will be rebuffed unconditionally and decisively, and its increasingly deeper plunge into the hybrid war against Russia will end up in a fiasco for the United States as scandalous and humiliating as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. In any case, frenzied attempts to save Zelensky's neo-Nazi regime are doomed.

Russia has never shied away from a diplomatic **resolution** to the Ukrainian crisis, a stance we have reiterated on numerous occasions even after negotiations were stopped in April 2022 under the direct guidance from the West. Apparently, reaching any substantial agreement with the current Kiev regime, which prohibited itself to speak to Russia directly by national legislation, and its Western sponsors unless the Russian interests and concerns are fully respected is unlikely.

They aggressively promote Zelensky's so-called "peace formula", which represents nothing, but a list of ultimatums aimed at the unconditional surrender of Russia, including the withdrawal of our troops from Donbass, Crimea, Zaporozhye, and Kherson regions. For Russia, territorial gains have never been the case – the accession of new regions, which happened in full compliance with the international law, was the only way to protect the Russian speaking population from neo-Nazi forces that were brought to power in Kiev in 2014 with the support from the West. A fair and sustainable settlement is only feasible if the foundational principles of Ukraine's sovereignty are reaffirmed – its neutral, non-aligned, and nuclear-free status recognized; the territorial realities on the ground acknowledged; assurances that Ukraine doesn't represent any threat to its neighbors fixed.

The coming "peace conference" in Switzerland in June is an attempt to legitimize "Zelensky formula" at a higher level. The goal is to bring together about 120 countries with the focus on the Global South countries, including India, which, on the other hand, largely stand for a genuine Russia's involvement in the process as a pre-condition for a lasting solution.

Since 2014, and particularly starting from the Special Military Operation, Westerners have systematically worked to **undermine Russia's stance on the international stage**. They've constructed a comprehensive system of interlocking initiatives aimed at holding our country "accountable" for "aggression", "occupation", and "annexation". From an ideological perspective, it is crucial for them to brand Russia as a violator of the "civilized world's norms", while simultaneously seeking to legitimize their unlawful anti-Russian actions.

Against this backdrop the narrative surrounding Ukrainian issue, as framed by Western powers, has increasingly found itself isolated, lacking traction even within multilateral mechanisms, traditionally seen as their sphere of influence. A compelling demonstration of this is seen in the UN International Court of Justice's decision at the beginning of 2024 rejecting nearly all of Ukraine's claims under conventions on combating terrorism financing, racial discrimination, and genocide, including motions regarding compensation. The Court refused to label Russia as a "state aggressor" or "sponsor of terrorism".

The extremely selfish ambitions aggressively implemented by the US and its Western allies to the detriment of other nations' interests continue to rapidly fragment **the international security landscape** and heat up the global situation.

Having grossly flouted the principle of equal and indivisible security, the US-led NATO bloc undertook a malicious expansion into the post-Soviet space, forcing our country to take necessary measures to protect its external security contour. Typically, our responsive actions are presented as a challenge followed by the narrative of the Russian threat.

The unilateral withdrawal of the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Open Skies Treaty as well as the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, led to the alarming situation in the nuclear missile sphere. Now, Washington is implementing its plans to deploy weapons that were previously prohibited under the INF treaty as well as those being part of the global Ballistic Missile Defense system in various regions of the world. This dangerous course is supplemented by the continuing NATO “nuclear sharing” practice with non-nuclear European countries in violation of the NPT obligations.

In these circumstances Russia finds itself not in a position to respond positively to the US proposals to re-launch the New START Treaty negotiations since it clearly can be misused under the proclaimed and widely conceptualized intention to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. The same reason is behind the Russian decision to withdraw its ratification of the CTBT.

Negative trends in international security directly affect the functioning of other international institutions. The multilateral structures, which constituted the backbone of cooperation in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, are becoming dysfunctional due to the attempts of the US and its allies to subordinate their activities to a so-called “rules-based order” with no clear explanations of what is behind it. Under such an approach vital mechanism such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (**OPCW**) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (**BTWC**) become hugely politicized. For a long time, Russia has openly made claims about military biological activities of around 400 dual-use bio-laboratories carried out far from the North American continent under the pretence of cooperation for peaceful purposes but with a direct involvement of the US Department of Defence. Jointly with other independent states of the Global majority we stand for consolidated efforts to strengthen the BTWC regime, primarily by adopting a universal, legally binding protocol to the Convention, that is the need of the hour.

The United States and its allies are also engaged in actions that threaten stability across vital **Asia-Pacific region**. Under the guise of promoting security there, narrow-group structures such as AUKUS, US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Philippines troikas are openly involved into practical cooperation with NATO. QUAD would have fallen into this line as well, if not for India that notably maintains its stance of strategic autonomy. These formats actually serve to acclimatize the regional players to a bloc-discipline to contain those who stand against unipolar confrontation approaches and cold-war mentality, namely China and Russia. Such efforts, however, significantly undermine the pivotal role of ASEAN, which has traditionally been at the center of fostering inclusive cooperation and stability in the region.

On various occasions we keep reiterating that with due understanding of the complexities between India and China, Russia confirms its sincere desire to support normalization of ties between our two closest partners and the promotion of the dialogue between the three of us that would be a strongest contribution to the stability in the Eurasian Space.

The evolution towards a multipolar world is not just inevitable; it is already underway. The principles of sovereignty, mutual respect, and genuine multilateral cooperation must be the cornerstones of international relations. The challenges we face are substantial, yet they offer opportunities to reshape the world order into one that is more equitable, just, and sustainable. Russia, through its actions and policies, is steadfast in its commitment to this vision, advocating for a global system that respects the diversity of civilizations and the multiplicity of development pathways.

As we delve deeper into the fabric of international trends, it is impossible to overlook the pivotal role of **Russia-India relations** in the current mise en scene. Against the backdrop of the complex geopolitical environment, our dynamic and time-tested strategic partnership significantly influences the global processes.

Historically friendly, trusted, coherent, diverse and exceptionally stable Russia-India strategic partnership appears as a core factor for the promotion of just and equal multipolarity. This is an example of mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation based on legitimate national interests. That explains why even under the current pressing circumstances our relations remain robust and keep growing in all directions. Naturally, all attempts to derail our ties that were openly declared by the Western politicians failed as we enjoy unshakable good will and national consensus in both countries defining our ability and capability to manage the new conditions. As Hon. Dr S Jaishankar used to say, Russia-India friendship is a constant. The reason for that is that our priorities have always been largely coinciding on universal basis as none of us wants to dominate and target our partnership against anyone, while both our nations aspire democracy and equality in international affairs based on the central role of the UN, its Charter and the international law.

Apparently, amidst the current unprecedented challenges we have found new opportunities for our relations to grow and transform. We significantly intensified the **contacts at all levels** with regular and warm dialogue between the leaders remains a driving force. This year they spoke already twice over the telephone, including on March 20 when Prime Minister Modi-ji congratulated President Putin on re-election.

Almost uninterrupted is the communication between Foreign Ministers in 2023, they met in-person 7 times on various occasions. Last month NSA Mr. Ajit Doval attended the High-Level International Security Conference in Saint Petersburg and had a fruitful bilateral meeting with his Russian counterpart Mr Patrushev as part of their traditional coordination. Active engagements in all working groups are on under the two – civil and defence – intergovernmental commissions with their next main sessions planned later this year. It's also high time to resume our "2+2" format between Foreign and Defence Ministers.

Dramatically increased the number and scope of **business missions** and events as well as **high-level interregional visits** along with invariably popular **cultural festivals**, dedicated interaction at the books, museums and tourism fairs and generally intense humanitarian ties. The first Russia-India Education Summit in April 2024 in New Delhi was well set to strengthen institutional foundations and expand opportunities in this promising and future-oriented area.

It is a matter of satisfaction that we re-discover each other and successfully utilize a new momentum that looks like a modern layer to the fundamentally solid background of our previous proud achievements.

Our **economic ties** have leapfrogged to record high levels adding to the expansion of mutual complementarity of our economies. After 2023, Russia managed to solidify its position as India's fourth largest trading partner with the turnover of USD 65 bn, according to the Indian statistics, and it keeps increasing. Although it happens due to the fact that Russia retains its leading positions in supplies of oil ensuring around one third of the Indian import as well as fertilizers, it anyway testifies the status of Russia as a major and reliable India's partner in energy and food security. Prevailing in the Indian market is also the share of Russian agricultural products, coal, diamonds, etc.

We recognize the problem of a huge trade imbalance amounting to around USD 55 bn, and we are committed to resolve it. The expansion of the Indian business and supplies to Russia, especially in the areas of high-technology engineering, machinery, pharma, electronics, smartphones, auto-

components will be most welcome. Along with that the diversification of economic ties is gradually ensured by the increasing number of joint ventures in petrochemicals, metallurgy, rubber production, railways, mining, airports modernization, construction, start-ups. Encouraging is the growing mutual interest in the investment projects in both countries, including in the energy sector. Ongoing is the dedicated dialogue in smart cities, civil aviation, shipbuilding, AI, infrastructure, water and waste management.

To even multiply our engagements, we work on the facilitation of smooth and **independent logistics and financial architecture**. Particularly, we implement the International North-South Transport Corridor and Vladivostok-Chennai Eastern Sea Route projects. The dialogue is going on in fintech, insurance and the establishment of new interbanking communication channels, including for the extended use of national currencies. A big task is to expedite the negotiation process to conclude FTA between the EAEU and India that would be instrumental to remove barriers, expand market access and support eliminating trade imbalance.

The above developments are very desired to supplement to the options to further upgrade our cooperation in the **branded strategic areas** such as atomic energy, defence and space. We demonstrate dedication and an innovative approach to comply with contemporary requirements and keenly share the best technologies, importantly – without putting political conditions in return.

Russia remains the only foreign country, which practically follows its commitments with India in the **nuclear power sector**. We successfully implement our Kudankulam NPP project comprising of six 1000 MW blocks equipped with the safest technologies. This area also involves active engagements in nuclear science and medicine, small modular reactors, emergency response, education and localization. More so, we are getting a promising experience in the Rooppur NPP construction in Bangladesh, which potentially can be utilized in other third countries.

With India consistently undertaking efforts to diversify the sources of arms supplies, Russia had always been and remains a key **defence partner** of India with at least 50% share of the country's arms market. It was Russia that became a pioneer in the localization and transfer of military technologies as well as the establishment of joint ventures even before "Make in India" and "Atmanirbhar Bharat" initiatives were launched. More than 170 military and industrial facilities have been created in India with the technical assistance of Russia. A highly successful supersonic cruise missile "BrahMos" joint venture is of course the most successful example of our bilateral engagement. Almost one thousand T-90 tanks and around three hundred Su-30MKI fighters with the localization of 70 to 90 percent have already been produced in India under licenses. We have fully operational joint venture "Indo-Russian Rifles" producing AK-203 assault rifles. We are enhancing the dialogue in the field of Research and Development on several prospective projects and see a growing interest from our Indian friends as our approach is also based on the experience of the Special Military Operation.

Russia also remains one of India's leading partners in **outer space exploration**. The Russian State Corporation "Roscosmos" and ISRO are deeply involved in the implementation of the Indian Gaganyaan mission by training astronauts, aiding in the development of a manned spacecraft, supplying life-support and crew-escape systems, flight suits, couches, rate sensors. Our vibrant partnership includes space propulsion engineering, cryogen engine construction, satellite navigation, establishing ground stations for receiving communication signals, space medicine. To achieve a new level, we need to explore new tracks emanating from the prospects of wider involvement of the private sector.

Whatever achievements we make, they would not be possible without our deep-rooted **humanitarian connections** that are cementing the good will to strengthen the relations.

Throughout the epochs the peoples of Russia and India have developed the mutual trust and understanding. We take profound interest in each other's history, culture and traditions that trace back to the names of Afanasy Nikitin, Leo Tolstoy, Rabindranath Tagore, Roerichs family and others, whose legacy in many ways creates the philosophical and cultural basis of our engagement.

The desired spectrum of dedicated events was significantly enriched by growing youth exchanges. This March Russia hosted the World Youth Festival in Sochi in March 2024 that brought together 20 thousand most passionate young people from all over the globe with almost 400 Indian delegates among them. To our delight, the Tiranga was one of the most recognizable symbols at the Festival. The programme included more than 800 various activities, such as Knowledge. First marathon, Russian language club, numerous exhibitions, music and dance performances, sports events, the Yoga session, discussions on economy and world politics, business networking and eventually the interaction with President Putin.

As part of our educational cooperation, we take targeted measures to increase the number of Indian students in Russia that is currently amounting to 20 thousand annually as well as to promote joint programmes between the institutions. Obviously, that is not the limit. What is especially important is that there is a growing demand for such graduates in the bilateral initiatives in various sectors – medicine, engineering, civil aviation, defence and even finance. Even more opportunities open up for those who have excelled their knowledge of the Russian language – the classes are widely available in the Russian Houses in New Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta, Chennai and Trivandrum as well as in around 50 Indian universities. Students from Amity University will be most welcome to join it next year.

A positive development is the steady increase of scholarships provided by the Russian Government. It is expected to grow from the current 200 to 500 specifically allocated for Indians. It is important to note the highest standards of the Russian education even though many of our universities don't feature in various Western rating lists.

There is huge scope for expansion and diversification of scholar's exchange and joint research projects. Over the recent years, we've witnessed an increasing number of initiatives and the establishment of direct contacts between the Russian and Indian universities, including Amity. Twinning programmes, double diplomas, visiting professors practice and other forms of students and academic exchanges can play well to upscale our educational partnerships.

Dear friends,

*The year 2024 in Russia-India relations is full of important engagements in the mentioned and other areas. They will take our multifaceted cooperation further for the benefit and the best interests of our two proud nations. I have no doubt that strengthening of our ties and coordination at the international platforms will keep contributing to the promotion of multipolarity as a core precondition to create a favorable environment for our countries to grow and prosper.*

*I would like to specifically mention that this year we also celebrate several important jubilees – the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the first Indian cosmonaut Rakesh Sharma flight to outer space as part of the Soviet crew, the 150<sup>th</sup> and the 120<sup>th</sup> birth anniversaries of Nicolas and Svyatoslav Roerichs as renowned Russian painters and philosophers who lived in India. These events are both a reminder of a deep-rooted background of our ties as well as a source of motivation for succeeding generations. That also means that whatever we do, it is an integral component of a sophisticated matrix of this unique and unparalleled friendship, which gives us unlimited opportunities to explore its potential.*

*Thank you very much!*

In 2024, the expanded BRICS became a reality, after China in 2017, proposed the idea of BRICS Plus. The admission of Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Ethiopia into BRICS+5 represents a major change in the balance of power internally for BRICS towards a more authoritarian group, challenging the democratic balance that existed within BRICS, by diluting the influence of democratic members India, Brazil, and South Africa.

The emergence of BRICS+5 has sparked a significant debate regarding its coherence and effectiveness as a global coalition (Beeson and Zeng 2018). The question that occupies the minds of scholars, policymakers and political pundits is what impact BRICS will have on the liberal international order<sup>1</sup>.

On one side, BRICS+5 is seen as presenting an opportunity for member states to assert their influence in global governance (Lissovolik 2023), to challenge the dominance of the liberal international order, and to promote a multipolar world (Hurrell 2019). On the other side of the debate, observers describe the internal dynamics of BRICS+5 as fractious and argue that the expansion of BRICS will lead to chaos and difficulty in establishing a unified agenda (Duggan et al 2022).

In this article I highlight the fundamental change in BRICS+5's character and present a critique of how the expansion of BRICS to BRICS+5 represents a strategic shift toward a more authoritarian-oriented coalition. I focus on China's Xi Jinping and Russia's Putin, leveraging BRICS expansion to promote and protect their individual interests, including promotion of the Beijing Consensus and challenging the liberal international order to gain benefits for themselves, such as avoiding sanctions for human rights violations and other breaches of international norms.

Xi Jinping and Putin both view the liberal international order as a system that constrains their domestic and international actions, particularly regarding human rights and governance standards. By attempting to reshape the international order, Xi Jinping and Putin aim to create a more favorable international environment that allows them greater freedom to pursue their interests freely, without facing punitive measures. In contrast to democracies, authoritarian leaders typically prioritise the interests of the state above those of the individual, where the state's goals, stability, and power take precedence over individual freedoms and rights to maintain state authority and cohesion.

Unlike the realist's perspective who predict great power struggles between the liberal international order and authoritarianism over the shape of international norms and institutions (Mearsheimer 2019), I argue that the liberal international order and the international norms and international institutions that characterize it will endure (Ikenberry 2018). The current

---

<sup>1</sup> Director of Indo-Pacific Studies Centre, Australia

international system is not solely dependent on American hegemonic power; rather, it is based on a broader set of organising principles and institutions that have evolved over centuries. This order provides incentives and opportunities for states to integrate into its economic and political frameworks, creating expanding constituencies with a vested interest in its preservation. Notably, China has demonstrated an interest in maintaining an open and multilateral global system, even while challenging U.S. hegemony. China's remarkable economic rise was made possible because the liberal international order rewarded its embrace of openness and trade-driven growth (ibid).

Argentina's decision to decline the invitation to join BRICS under President Javier Milei highlights the complex ideological and geopolitical challenges facing the newly expanded BRICS+5 bloc. The situation underscores key issues facing BRICS+5, including the ideological and geopolitical diversity and differences among its members (Mia 2024).

Compared to BRICS, the BRICS+5 projects a strong asymmetrical image wherein its bias tends clearly towards authoritarianism, initially carried by China and Russia's authoritarianism, now firmly supported, by the admission of four more authoritarian states, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There exists an unambiguous polarization within the BRICS+5 group, between countries that uphold democratic norms and those that suppress political freedoms and dissent.

China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, and Egypt exhibit strong authoritarian characteristics with centralised control over political power, limited public political participation, and restricted press freedom. Brazil, India, and South Africa generally uphold democratic processes such as regular elections and some degree of judicial independence and media freedom. Ethiopia presents a complex scenario where there have been efforts and movements towards democracy, but recent conflicts and governmental actions lean towards authoritarian practices.

This division in BRICS+5 membership creates challenges for cooperation, as differences in regime type are associated with higher levels of distrust (Fracalossi de Moraes 2020). These intragroup power asymmetries, dominated by China and Russia, also raised fears among BRICS members of potential unequal agreements and therefore likely to hinder cooperation (ibid). This situation has the potential to be exacerbated in BRICS+5, particularly as member states including India, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are assiduously balancing their highly valued relations with the US and its allies.

But despite this significant variation in political ideologies among BRICS+5, strategic bilateral alignments exist between the members for common economic and geopolitical benefits (Cooper and Farooq 2013). Despite the ideological differences, BRICS+5 members find common ground in economic interests, a desire for greater global influence, and the goal of reshaping aspects of the international order to better suit their collective interests (Brosig 2024).

For these reasons, BRICS+5 should not be analysed myopically, since it is a complex grouping of individual states managing bilateralism and multilateralism contemporaneously. BRICS+5 is a complex multilateral forum that balances individual state interests with collective action. While members manage bilateral tensions, such as the China-India border dispute, they

cooperate on shared objectives like sustainable development through institutions like the New Development Bank (Vazquez 2021).

The complexities of BRICS+5 have been interpreted from different perspectives. Democratising the post-war liberal world order has been argued as a positive development that will lead towards increasing the representation and influence of emerging economies in global decision-making processes, particularly within institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, where the USA currently holds significant sway (Nuruzzaman 2020). While these countries seek to democratise global institutions like the World Bank and IMF, it has been argued that their impact remains limited due to internal differences and lack of a cohesive vision. The new institutions like the Contingency Reserve Arrangement and New Development Bank have emerged as alternatives, some commentators are arguing they are unlikely to supplant the existing Bretton Woods institutions (Lipsy 2017).

Alternatively, from a completely different perspective, the expansion of BRICS to include additional authoritarian countries, is seen as a strategic shift towards a more authoritarian-oriented coalition. This is particularly evident with the influence of China's Xi Jinping and Russia's Putin, who are leveraging this expansion to promote and protect their individual interests. The political and ideological heterogeneity within BRICS+5, with China and Russia being more authoritarian, contrasts with the democratic systems of India, Brazil, and South Africa, highlighting the diverse nature of the coalition.

A strategic shift towards a more authoritarian-oriented coalition in BRICS could have several consequences. It may exacerbate geopolitical tensions between BRICS and liberal democracies, as the coalition could be perceived as a counterbalance to liberal influence. The ideological and political differences between authoritarian and democratic members within BRICS could lead to internal friction, affecting the group's cohesion and effectiveness. Such a shift might influence global governance structures, potentially leading to reforms that reflect the interests of authoritarian regimes, thereby challenging the liberal democratic norms traditionally upheld by liberal institutions. The coalition might prioritize economic policies that favor state-led development models, which could impact global trade and investment patterns. An authoritarian-oriented coalition might downplay human rights issues, affecting international efforts to promote human rights and democratic governance as is evident in the current stance of the South and its contrasting response to the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East (Schirm 2023).

The liberal international order emphasises democracy, market economy and universal human rights as guiding principles for the international order, whereas the illiberal states prioritise national autonomy, non-intervention in internal affairs and state-permeated economies. Hence, the illiberal states rejected military aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, instead cultivating a good relationship with Moscow and criticizing liberal conceptions of world order as paternalistic. It has also been argued that the BRICS countries, especially Russia and China, have actively shaped the current security order by preventing the outcomes preferred by liberal democracies in conflicts like Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and South Sudan. In this regard the preferred outcomes (removal of Assad, isolation of Russia) have been actively prevented by BRICS (Brosig and Brosig 2019).

Within BRICS+5, Iran and Saudi Arabia have historically been regional rivals, and India and China have serious ongoing border disputes, which only four years ago erupted in military conflict. China and Russia until recently have long held frosty relations arising from deeply embedded mistrust and residual Cold War tensions. 'India and the PRC have conflicting interests and visions concerning the future of Asia and, by extension, the broader global order'<sup>2</sup>.

BRICS nations are described as 'a heterogeneous composition, marked by diverse civilisational and cultural contexts' (ibid). This diversity makes it challenging to establish BRICS as a 'coherent and pertinent geopolitical bloc' (ibid). The expansion of BRICS, to BRICS+5 further complicates this dynamic by introducing more diverse interests and potential conflicts (e.g., between Saudi Arabia and Iran)<sup>3</sup>.

While some analysts fear BRICS+5 seeks to replace the existing global order, evidence suggests the group aims more for reform than replacement (Diplomat July 2024). The joint statement from BRICS foreign ministers in 2024 indicates a desire for 'a more agile, effective, efficient, responsive, representative, legitimate, democratic and accountable international and multilateral system' suggests a strategy of working within existing frameworks while pushing for greater representation of the Global South (ibid).

A key area of alignment among BRICS members is in economic cooperation and efforts to reduce dependence on the US dollar. The group has explored creating a reference unit between their currencies and establishing alternative financial institutions like the New Development Bank (Geneva Policy Outlook). Despite internal tensions, BRICS+5 has demonstrated its ability to provide geopolitical leverage for members, such as supporting Russia in the face of sanctions, demonstrating the group's potential to challenge aspects of the existing global order (Polytechnique Insights). There are areas where BRICS+5 members find strong alignment, particularly in sectors like raw materials and energy. BRICS+5 has become a major player in oil, metals, and food production markets, potentially leading to the development of a "mineral bloc" or coordination of extractive and trade policies (ibid).

Notwithstanding the competing and divergent interest of members in BRICS+, there exist forces and mechanisms which work in favour of balancing them against each other. For example, the establishment of institutions like the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement provides a platform for cooperation and dialogue, helping to mediate differences and align interests through shared economic projects and financial stability mechanisms. Despite political differences, BRICS+5 countries share common economic goals, such as enhancing trade, investment, and infrastructure development, which can serve as a unifying force. BRICS has traditionally held regular summits and meetings offering opportunities for diplomatic engagement, allowing members to negotiate and reconcile their differences while promoting mutual interests.

Moreover, most BRICS+5 members hold a common opposition to liberal dominance, particularly that of the USA, which acts as a cohesive factor, encouraging members to collaborate despite their divergent political systems and interests. Finally, and importantly, the flexibility of BRICS+5 allows for varying degrees of cooperation on different issues, enabling members to pursue bilateral or multilateral initiatives that align with their national interests

while maintaining overall group cohesion. A caveat to this last factor is that bilateralism can thwart the development of a common narrative on global issues like health, security, and trade (Vazquez 2021).

## **Conclusion**

This article's exploration of BRICS+5's strategic shift towards a more authoritarian coalition and its potential impact on global governance sets the stage for a deeper examination of how these dynamics might influence the persistence and transformation of the liberal international order

The expansion of BRICS to BRICS+5 in 2024, with the inclusion of Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Ethiopia, marks a significant shift in the coalition's dynamics. This expansion leans towards a more authoritarian governance model, challenging the democratic balance previously maintained by India, Brazil, and South Africa. Such a shift raises concerns about the internal cohesion of the group and its ability to establish a unified agenda. While BRICS+5 presents opportunities for member states to assert influence and promote a multipolar world, it also risks potential chaos due to ideological diversity and power asymmetries, particularly with China and Russia playing dominant roles.

Despite these challenges, the member states share common economic interests and a collective desire to reshape global governance. This could lead to the promotion of a more state-led development model, impacting international norms and human rights advocacy. The coalition's success will largely depend on its ability to navigate internal tensions while pursuing its collective goals.

The BRICS group, originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has been increasingly challenging the existing international order. Rather than seeking to completely replace global governance structures, BRICS aims to reform them. This coalition is viewed as a potential economic alliance focused on resource management and geopolitical influence. Various analyses suggest that BRICS is advocating for a multipolar world that better reflects the interests of emerging economies.

In conclusion, the expansion to BRICS+5 represents both opportunities and challenges. The coalition's future effectiveness will hinge on its ability to manage internal diversity and power dynamics while advancing a shared agenda. Further research is needed to explore the evolving nature of BRICS+5, particularly in terms of its internal dynamics, economic strategies, and influence on international norms. This research will provide deeper insights into the coalition's role in reshaping the global order.

## **REFERENCES**

- Beeson, M., & Zeng, J. (2018). The BRICS and global governance: China's contradictory role. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(10), 1962-1978.
- Brosig, M. (2024). Has BRICS lost its appeal? The foreign policy value added of the group. *International Politics*, 61(1), 106-124.

Cooper, A. F., & Farooq, A. B. (2013). BRICS and the Privileging of Informality in Global Governance. *Global Policy*, 4(4), 428-433.

Duggan, N., Hooijmaaijers, B., Rewizorski, M., & Arapova, E. (2022). Introduction: 'The BRICS, global governance, and challenges for South-South cooperation in a post-Western world'. *International Political Science Review*, 43(4), 469-480.

Fracalossi de Moraes, R. (2020). Whither security cooperation in the BRICS? Between the protection of norms and domestic politics dynamics. *Global Policy*, 11(4), 439-447.

Hurrell, A. (2019-12-16). 5. Rising powers and the emerging global order. In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 4 Oct. 2024, from <https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198825548.001.0001/hepl-9780198825548-chapter-5>; and Hurrell, A. (2014). Rising powers and the emerging global order. *The Globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations*, 80-94.

Lipsky, P. Y. (2017). *Renegotiating the world order: Institutional change in international relations*. Cambridge University Press; Lipsky, P. Y. (2017). *Renegotiating the world order: Institutional change in international relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Lissovlik, Y. (2023). BRICS-Plus: the New Force in Global Governance. *Journal of International Analytics*.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order. *International security*, 43(4), 7-50.

Mia, I. (2024). Argentina's Foreign Policy Under Milei: Limited Disruption?. In *Survival: February-March 2024* (pp. 49-55). Routledge; Lissovlik, Y. (2023). BRICS Plus following the 2023 "expansion summit". *Pathways to Peace and Security*.

Nuruzzaman, M. (2020). Why BRICS is no threat to the post-war liberal world order. *International Studies*, 57(1), 51-66.

Schirm, S. A. (2023). Alternative world orders? Russia's Ukraine war and the domestic politics of the BRICS. *The International Spectator*, 58(3), 55-73.

Sultan, B., & Mehmood, A. (2020). Pakistan and the BRICS Plus in the New Era: A Perspective of Neo-Functionalism. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 14(3), 447-463.

Vazquez, K. C. (2021). Brazil and BRICS multilateralism à la carte: from bilateralism to community interest. *Global Policy*, 12(4), 534-538; and Niu, H., & Hong, S. (2021). A Chinese perspective: Will China-India friction paralyze the BRICS?. *Global Policy*, 12(4), 524-528.

---

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> John Ikenberry, defines an international order as "the 'governing' arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions", and a liberal international order as one that "is open and loosely rule based", creating "a foundation in which states can engage in reciprocity and institutionalized cooperation", Ikenberry, G. I. (2011), *Liberal Leviathan*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

<sup>2</sup> Council on Geostrategy. (n.d.). How does BRICS challenge the prevailing international order? Britain's World. Retrieved from <https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/how-does-brics-challenge-the-prevailing-international-order/>

<sup>3</sup> Polytechnique Insights. (n.d.). The BRICS: Economic alliance or future private club of raw materials? Retrieved from <https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/geopolitics/the-brics-economic-alliance-or-future-private-club-of-raw-materials/>

## Emerging Role of BRICS: Shaping Global Security and Peacebuilding

Samir Bhattacharya<sup>1</sup>

On June 10, 2024, during the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the BRICS countries meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, the discussion encompassed a number of crucial issues both at the regional and international levels, including global instabilities.<sup>1</sup> One key matter of discussion was Sudan's ongoing civil war and its consequent instabilities. As the civil war in Sudan crosses 500 days without any end in sight, the humanitarian disaster in the country is getting exacerbated every passing day with more than 10.7 million people internally displaced and half of the population is facing starvation.<sup>2</sup> The expanded BRICS bloc, which now includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iran, and Russia, all have some vested interests in the Sudan crisis and its aftermath. Therefore, the question is whether BRICS as an institution would be interested in playing the peacebuilder role and whether Sudan could be their first test case.

It's interesting to note that security occupies a significant space on the organisation's agenda, even though its primary focus is economic endeavours. There's no denying that the coalition wants to include international security in its expanding role.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the BRICS narrative has consistently emphasised security and peace. The BRICS have frequently stated their intention to assume more responsibility at the regional and global levels as well as their willingness to support the maintenance and stability of the international order.<sup>4</sup>

Evidently, security-related concerns have started to crop up more frequently in the most recent BRICS publications. For example, the number of references to "security" (32) and "terrorism/terrorist" (36) in the 2016 Goa summit declaration was similar to the number of references to "economic" (36).<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, several security meetings have been held by the coalition's member state national security advisors. However, there hasn't been a comparable turning point in the coalition's institutionalisation of security, in contrast to the New Development Bank (NDB), which indicates an increasing interest in economic matters among its member nations.

### Global Security as BRICS Agenda

Therefore, when the foreign ministers of the BRICS countries met in Russia and unanimously reaffirmed the idea of "African solutions to African problems", it came as a surprise to many. Indeed, African solutions should continue to form the cornerstone of conflict resolution in Africa. Yet, the African Union is clearly unable to resolve the crisis because of its structural issues. Therefore, it is puzzling that the BRICS group declined to act as a conflict mediator, particularly considering that many of its members have significant expertise in international peacebuilding initiatives, including those in Africa.

For instance, China, one of the BRICS countries, has recently become more involved in global peacebuilding initiatives encompassing political mediation, peacekeeping, and conflict management in war-torn nations like Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar.<sup>6</sup> Another member,

---

<sup>1</sup>Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation

Russia, through the Wagner Group, a private military corporation recently renamed as Africa Corps, actively provides security throughout the African continent.<sup>7</sup> It's interesting to note that since both nations are Security Council permanent members, they have more structural authority to participate in international peacebuilding initiatives.<sup>8</sup> It is probably time for the BRICS countries to choose to formally assume the role of peacebuilders in the Global South.

Contrary to popular perception, its security agenda has progressed since the grouping was founded, although uneven and painstakingly slow, as evidenced in various BRICS documents. During the first annual summits, the member states' top priorities were addressing the impacts of the financial crisis, as seen by the coalition's emphasis on economic cooperation among the member states and brainstorming ways to reduce the shock of the global financial crisis (GFC).<sup>9</sup> With subsequent summits and frequent ministerial and sub-ministerial meetings, the agenda of the BRICS Declarations and their corresponding Plans of Action has expanded to encompass global security.

The BRICS nations also reaffirm their opposition to terrorism in all forms. They support the UN enacting a Convention on International Terrorism, promoting and enhancing counterterrorism efforts by fostering collaboration. The BRICS nations are also debating developing a more potent global information security framework and combating cybercrime.<sup>10</sup>

The BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICT is one example of how the BRICS have collectively addressed this issue.<sup>11</sup> Examples of how BRICS members have integrated security at the national level include the international counterterrorism conventions hosted by India<sup>12</sup> and Russia's role as a mediator in the Syrian peace process and in the greater MENA region<sup>13</sup>. Other examples include initiatives only some groups have taken, like the treaty draft that China and Russia submitted to the Conference on Disarmament<sup>14</sup>. The treaty is meant to prevent the placement of weapons in space. However, as the BRICS nations prepare to take centre stage in world politics, they should consider leading peacebuilding projects.

### **Position of BRICS on UN-led Security regime**

International peace and security are primarily the responsibility of the UN Security Council, one of the six central UN bodies established through the UN Charter.<sup>15</sup> Whereas the label of "Alternative World Order" or "China-led world order" has frequently and often casually been associated with BRICS in Western discourse, BRICS does not want to supplant the UN system or the UNSC as the organisation that provides global security.<sup>16</sup> At best, it aims to enhance the current system and raise the voice of the global south.<sup>17</sup> Besides, the BRICS is not a defence alliance. It does not even seek to possess a unified military force despite the coalition members' ostensibly growing interest in collaborating on international security matters.

Furthermore, in contrast to regional organisations, which rely on spatially defined common interests to build a collaborative agenda, BRICS is spatially independent. BRICS is a loose alliance of emerging nations without any physical logic of contiguousness. For quite some time, there has been a discourse concerning the reform of the United Nations, encompassing its Security Council, concerning augmenting the participation of developing nations in the Council's membership. BRICS wholeheartedly support the idea of UN expansion, making it more representative and reflective of the current world order.<sup>18</sup> In the meantime, as an institution, BRICS also seeks to supplement the traditional UN efforts by effectively addressing current global concerns and advancing the rightful aspirations of the Global South.

Therefore, when the first BRICS Working Group on Peacekeeping was established in Johannesburg under the framework of the 2018 Declaration, it signalled the group's interest in expanding its agenda in the security domain.<sup>19</sup> The BRICS nations support upholding universal values, including equality, non-aggression, territorial integrity, unity, and respect for sovereignty. The organisation also highlights how important it is that the UN Security Council (UNSC) and other UN institutions undergo significant reform. India, Brazil, and South Africa want to be more involved in the UN system now that China and Russia are permanent members.

Further, BRICS countries acknowledge that the UN is crucial in preserving and advancing global security and peace. They reiterate that the UN Charter and widely accepted standards of international law ought to function as the foundation for and guide all peacekeeping and peace-making operations, such as preventive deployments and post-conflict peacebuilding. Truly, over the last one decade, BRICS nations have made substantial contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts, playing prominent roles in providing financial and military resources to UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, the BRICS have frequently voiced candid criticism of the values and norms that Western nations advocate for resolving disputes. The group has frequently voiced scepticism towards actions and ideologies that could jeopardise the political independence and territorial integrity of sovereign states, placing a significant focus on the concepts of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The primary illustration of this can be seen in the harsh rebuke of NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya, which was held accountable for the disintegration of state institutions, mainly the army and law enforcement agencies, and the subsequent escalation of terrorist activity in the nation.<sup>21</sup> The Ufa Declaration was strongly worded, although it did not specifically mention NATO or any NATO ally engaged in the Libyan operation.<sup>22</sup> This is likely due to the group's common aversion to Western interventionism in crises involving fragile states.

Towards this objective, the BRICS have supported a dispute resolution strategy over the years that emphasises the sensitivities of developing nations still recovering from colonialism. From a South-focused point of view, the group acknowledged the contribution of regional and sub-regional institutions like the African Union, the Arab League, or the Economic Community of West African States, and it has explicitly said that it endorses initiatives that are "nationally-led, nationally-owned" in peace processes.<sup>23</sup>

## **Way forward**

The absence of a budget, secretariat, single market, standards-setting body, and institutional structure characterises BRICS. Though a big step toward non-Western investment, the BRICS New Development Bank is significantly smaller than the World Bank or European Investment Bank. In addition, the priorities and profiles of the ten countries vary and frequently conflict with one another. However, the fundamental ideas of peaceful coexistence at the basis of any multilateral organisation like BRICS remain as crucial as ever in a world where realpolitik and big power rivalries increasingly rule international interactions.

In the future, the group will undoubtedly have more influence over this particular area of decision-making thanks to its rising economic and political clout, growing size, expanding financial opportunities, and active foreign policy. In their first fifteen years of existence, the BRICS have

shown a growing desire to extend their collaboration from the traditional domains of development and the economy to international security.

Despite the institutionalisation of security issues moving more slowly than development cooperation, the BRICS countries may soon need to take a unified stance on several security-related concerns, such as food security, energy security, and maritime security, including piracy. Therefore, the member countries must identify a few key areas of security cooperation for Russia inside the BRICS framework. This becomes more crucial as the talk of its expansion during the upcoming summit continues.

---

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2024). Joint Statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations.

[https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37860/Joint\\_Statement\\_of\\_the\\_BRICS\\_Ministers\\_of\\_Foreign\\_AffairsInternational\\_Relations#:~:text=The%20BRICS%20Ministers%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%2FInternational%20Relations%20met%20on,a%20regional%20trends%20and%20issues.](https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37860/Joint_Statement_of_the_BRICS_Ministers_of_Foreign_AffairsInternational_Relations#:~:text=The%20BRICS%20Ministers%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%2FInternational%20Relations%20met%20on,a%20regional%20trends%20and%20issues.)

<sup>2</sup> Sudan: 500 days of war, and a failing humanitarian response. (2024). *Medecins sans frontiers*. <https://msf.org.uk/article/sudan-500-days-war-and-failing-humanitarian-response>

<sup>3</sup> Peter Dizikes. (2023) The BRICS expansion and the global balance of power. *MIT News*. <https://news.mit.edu/2023/taylor-fravel-brics-expansion-0926>

<sup>4</sup> Peter van Ham. (2015). The BRICS as an EU Security Challenge: The case for Conservatism. *Clingendael Institute*. <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/brics-eu-security-challenge-case-conservatism>

<sup>5</sup> Abdenur, A. E. (2017). Can the BRICS cooperate in international security. *International Organisations Research Journal*, 12(3), 73-93.

<sup>6</sup> Samir Bhattacharya. (2024). China's conflict resolution mechanism in Africa: Mediation with Chinese characteristics. *Observer Research Foundation*. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-s-conflict-resolution-mechanism-in-africa-mediation-with-chinese-characteristics>

<sup>7</sup> John A Lechner. (2024). Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/>

<sup>8</sup> Dr Jiayi Zhou, Dr Jaïr van der Lijn and Dr Jingdong Yuan. (2024) China, Russia and the future of peacebuilding. *STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE*.

<https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2024/china-russia-and-future-peacebuilding>

<sup>9</sup> Agarwal M, Azim R, Kumar S (2022) BRICS: The 2008 financial crisis and economic performance. *BRICS Journal of Economics* 3(2): 21-49.

<sup>10</sup> Belli, L. (Ed.). (2021). *CyberBRICS: Cybersecurity regulations in the BRICS countries*. Springer Nature.

<sup>11</sup> Belli, L. (2020). Data Protection in the BRICS Countries: Enhanced Cooperation and Convergence towards Legal Interoperability. *SSRN*.

<sup>12</sup> Chandra, V. (2020). India's counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations: Progress and problems. *India Quarterly*, 76(1), 40-57.

<sup>13</sup> Kostelyanets, S. V. (2019). Russia's peace initiatives in the MENA region: evaluation and prospects. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 13(4), 534-555.

<sup>14</sup> Mehdi, M., & Su, J. (2020). Prevention of an arms race in outer space and developing countries. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 32(2), 253-270.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations. Maintain International Peace and Security. <https://www.un.org/en/our-work/maintain-international-peace-and-security>

<sup>16</sup> Maria Slonskaya. (2015). The Role of BRICS in Global Security. *MGIMO-University*. [https://mgimo.ru/upload/2015/10/The\\_Role\\_of\\_BRICS\\_in\\_Global\\_Security.pdf?utm\\_source=google.com&utm\\_medium=organic&utm\\_campaign=google.com&utm\\_referrer=google.com](https://mgimo.ru/upload/2015/10/The_Role_of_BRICS_in_Global_Security.pdf?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com)

<sup>17</sup> Muqtadar Khan and Lucas Lima. (2024). An Expanding BRICS Seeks to Reform Not Replace the Global Order. *The Diplomat*. <https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/an-expanding-brics-seeks-to-reform-not-replace-the-global-order/>

---

<sup>18</sup> Goodrich, John. 2018. Decoding BRICS: What are the security priorities. *CGTN*. <https://news.cgtn.com>

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2018). 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration. [https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30190/10th\\_BRICS\\_Summit\\_Johannesburg\\_Declaration](https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30190/10th_BRICS_Summit_Johannesburg_Declaration)

<sup>20</sup> Luchi Gogoi. (2020). BRICS: It's role in world politics--*Palarch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology* 17(7), 10720-10728. ISSN 1567-214

<sup>21</sup> Nuruzzaman, M. (2022). "Responsibility to Protect" and the BRICS: A Decade after the Intervention in Libya. *Global Studies Quarterly*, 2(4), ksac051.

<sup>22</sup> Panova, V. V. (2018). The BRICS security agenda: Russia's approach and the outcomes of the Ufa Summit. In *BRICS and Global Governance* (pp. 129-149). Routledge.

<sup>23</sup> Cutrera, F. (2020). Do the BRICS Care about International Security. *BPC Policy Brief*, 9(2).

## Russia in BRICS: Pioneering Partnerships for Global Stability

Mr. Otabek Khomidov<sup>1</sup>

The BRICS group comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—a powerful grouping that heralds the major shift toward a more multipolar world in which the axis of emerging economies plays a central role in world affairs. Of these countries, Russia no doubt occupies a very privileged place, welding geopolitical influence together with natural resource wealth and historical importance. This paper explores the role of Russia in BRICS in its economic, political, and strategic roles and how it interfaces with the world.

Contributing to the economic factor, Russia is important to BRICS mostly due to its rich resources and economic contribution. Being one of the world's largest energy producers, the accumulated Russian oil, gas, and mineral reserves definitely shape economic dynamics within the group. The exports of energy from Russia would give necessary support to key consumers in BRICS, such as China and India, to reach energy security and stability. Such an abundance of resource base buffers BRICS against global economic instability, aids in averaging out the global commodity prices, and stabilizes markets across regions. Besides providing a base for geostrategic consequences, the BRICS membership has also presented Russia with a host of opportunities toward economic diversification, dependence on Western markets, and promotion of a balanced economic approach within the group. The diversification strengthens BRICS to become resistant against global economic fluctuations and fosters overall stability.

Trade and investment are other areas where Russia's influence is strongly felt inside BRICS. Apart from the fact that economic growth for the group is stimulated by Russia's participation in large-scale trade activities, it acts as a driver of trade and investment flows. Russian investments in infrastructure projects, such as pipelines and transport corridors, allow for greater connectivity between BRICS members and provide a further boost to economic integration. Such Russian involvement in energy and infrastructure projects across BRICS countries will spur economic development and widen its sphere of influence in the group. A case in point is the major energy deals which Russia has with China and India, demonstrating that it plays a vital role in reinforcing economic relations within BRICS, especially in reinforcing the bloc's collective economic power.

Russia makes a critical contribution to enhancing geopolitical influence since it holds permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. This status gives Russia significant diplomatic leverage inside the group and helps BRICS to speak louder on international issues and challenge the existing Western-oriented global governance architecture. Active participation by Russia is in line with the BRICS concept of a multipolar world order. It calls for the reform of international institutions so that they better reflect the interests of emerging economies. Such positioning, therefore, allows BRICS to serve for Russia as a counterbalancing force to the Western hegemony and stimulates the establishment of a more representative and inclusive system of global governance.

Apart from the geopolitical function, Russia sees BRICS as an important structure in the building of strategic relations with other leading developing countries. The solidarity within BRICS provides member states with an opportunity to overcome common challenges

---

<sup>1</sup> Teaching Associate, Amity University Haryana

emanating from the Global North. The diplomatic involvement by Russia has helped this group reach a consensus on everything, from economic policy to security, which makes BRICS as a whole more capable of negotiating with other countries in the world arena. In such a way, when BRICS is united in front of key international issues, it turns out to be more capable of influencing global decisions and advancing shared interests. Another issue within the BRICS grouping on which Russia seeks to make its presence felt involves security and defense cooperation. The contribution of its military expertise and technological wherewithal to the group is crucial, especially for the member states that seek an upgrade of their security infrastructure. BRICS does not have any formal security arrangement; Russia's process for sharing defense knowledge and technology on an informal basis has been vitally important in consolidating stability and security in the member countries. This cooperation further establishes Russia's strategic role within BRICS to achieve even higher levels of coherence and international impact on the group as a whole.

In general, Russian interests coincide with the rest of the BRICS membership on issues concerning the settlement of regional disputes and addressing security challenges. The cooperation with BRICS in security matters allows Russia and its partners to address certain threats together more effectively toward the goal of increased regional and global security. It has made this shared focus an avenue for BRICS to act as one entity in dealing with pressing issues on security matters which stabilize areas of mutual concern. Russia has also been instrumental in shaping the institutional framework for BRICS through its engagements toward the establishment of such structures as the NDB and CRA, two major formations offering a basis for infrastructure development and financial stability within BRICS countries. In particular, the NDB is earmarked for the provision of finances toward sustainable development projects, not just within BRICS but also other developing nations. With active involvement on Russia's part in management, it would therefore be found that compensation is struck regarding paying attention to its strategic interests while at the same time contributing to the broader objectives of the group.

Moreover, the role of Russia in BRICS is not confined to political dialogue and institutional development but also covers active participation in several current joint development projects. Its expertise in technology, science, and education propels the cooperative momentum of the group. For example, the achievements of Russia in space and scientific research have been transferred to other BRICS countries in order to further strengthen cooperation in these key areas. This sort of collaboration will further strengthen the commitment of the group toward mutual development and innovation, with Russia's leading role within BRICS being strengthened. A variety of challenges within the BRICS group also faces this organization, given the different interests within its membership. Each country has priorities that differ with regard to economic strategies, political ideologies, and regional issues that create frictions within the group at times. While these differences remain big, they can be toned down through effective leadership and diplomacy. Given the great diplomatic experience and far-reaching strategic vision, Russia may actually lead through these complexities. It will be only through consensus building and espousal of cooperation that Russia would help ensure that BRICS remains cohesive and relevant despite centrifugal internal tensions brought on by often-competing national priorities of its membership.

Besides internal dynamics, external threats to BRICS come vis-à-vis global economic and political uncertainties. The economic instability, geopolitical tensions, and turnabouts in the

international political environment threaten the stability and objectives of the organization. The strategic response from Russia to these uncertainties is bound by developing resilient strategies in cooperation with its BRICS associates. Only then, strengthening economic relations, increasing diplomatic interaction, and dealing with global challenges together may provide a sufficient basis for Russia's contribution to the protection of the future of this group and the preservation of its influence on world processes. This collaborative approach is going to be important as BRICS walks through complexities around an increasingly unpredictable global environment.

In this regard, the importance of Russia in BRICS is multi-spectral, ranging from economic and political to strategic aspects. Its rich resources add geopolitical weight and contribute to the development of BRICS institutions, thereby making valuable additions to the collective strength and global impact of the group. As BRICS develops further, Russian leadership and engagement will, therefore, remain crucial in setting the future trajectory of BRICS and consolidating its position in international relations. Using its resources, strategic alliances, and institutional contributions, Russia promotes its interests and those of BRICS in general. The success and influence of BRICS will depend on the effort to overcome internal problems and external uncertainties, which will come from the collective effort of its members, of which Russia is a key driver.

---

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- BRICS. (n.d.). BRICS information portal. Retrieved from <https://www.brics.org>
- Putin, V. (2017). Russia's role in a multipolar world: Reflections on global governance. *Russian International Affairs Council*, 35(2), 23-45.
- Stuenkel, O. (2015). *The BRICS and the future of global order*. Lexington Books.
- Xiang, L., & Zhou, W. (2021). BRICS and the changing dynamics of global economic governance. *Global Policy*, 12(3), 376-389.
- Yermakov, V. (2020). Russia's energy strategy and its role in BRICS. *Energy Policy Journal*, 48(1), 9-20.
- Ziegler, C. E. (2022). Russia's strategy in BRICS and its geopolitical significance. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 7(1), 42-57.

## Neo-Nazis and the Russia Ukraine Crisis: A genuine Concern or mere Consternation?

Aniket Vaibhav<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction:

Renowned German sociologist, Claus Leggewie in his book published in 2011 discusses the European memory culture. According to him there are seven major circles of European memory and Nazism is one of them<sup>i</sup>. As an atrocious part of the European past that took place on its soil, Nazism was supposed to be limited to that continent only, but the dominance of Europe over other hemispheres-generally referred to as Eurocentrism- combined together with the influential position of the Jewish community ensured that it became a topic of discussion and critical assessment in other parts of the world too.

Though Nazism officially came to an end with the end of the Second World War, however, both in theory as well as in practice, it doesn't seem to die down completely, and the on-going Russia Ukraine conflict is a prime example of that. This intellectual intervention seeks to shed light on the role and relevance of neo-Nazi groups in the on-going Russia-Ukraine conflict on both sides. Since the neo-Nazi ideology is synonymous with the Right wing extremism, this article argues that the presence of such groups in Russia-Ukraine conflict has global repercussions too, as it has given a cause to far right extremist groups in other countries to mobilise themselves and join the confrontation going on in Ukraine, be it virtually or physically.

One of the major reasons cited by the Russian president Vladimir Putin for military onslaught on Ukraine was to 'denazify' the country and its leadership. According to him the move was aimed at protecting the people who have been "subjected to bullying and genocide"<sup>ii</sup>. However, many media reports attest the presence of neo-Nazi militants fighting for Russia and Ukraine, both. It's not that the neo-Nazi factions have emerged overnight in Ukraine or in Russia. Rather, both the countries have had a history of either conniving with or fighting against the Nazi forces. On one hand Ukraine supported the Nazi ideology during the Second World War. The German soldiers who took control of Kyiv in 1941 were welcomed with banners of "Heil Hitler", and some 34,000 Jews along with Roma people and other 'undesirables' were paraded to the outskirts of the city in the name of resettlement and brutally massacred, that came to be known as "Holocaust by bullets" in the annals of history<sup>iii</sup>. On the other hand Russia established itself as the antithesis of the Nazism during the same period and fought against the forces of Hitler tooth and nail.

The current situation in Russia and Ukraine is not different either. In recent past Ukraine has witnessed Swastika-laden vandalism and eerie marches in Kyiv and other major cities that celebrated Waffen SS. In addition to that, Ukraine has also erected many statues of its nationalists whose legacies are tainted by their connivance with the Nazi ideology vis-à-vis ideologues. Stepan Bandera of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) is one such controversial figure whose followers actively collaborated with the German army and the SS.

---

<sup>1</sup> Assistant Professor at Amity University Haryana.

People like Roman Sukhevych, a person responsible for the slaughter of hundreds of Jews and Poles or Yaroslav Stetsko, who openly called for the extermination of the Jews in Ukraine are other personalities revered as nationalists in Ukraine. In addition to that, Ukraine also has a large base of battle-hardened battalions like Azov who fought Moscow-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine following Crimea's invasion by Russia. According to the founding leader of Azov battalion Ukraine's national purpose was to get rid of Jews and other inferior races. In spite of the strong words from the US Congress in 2018 that the aid given to Ukraine can't be used to provide arms, training and other assistance to the Azov battalion, the support to it is continuing unabashedly. Azov is now official member of the Ukrainian National Guard.

As far as Russia is concerned, Dr. Robert Horvath, Professor at La Trobe University writes that the surge of right wing extremism at other places is well documented; however, the same is not the case about the covert collaboration of Putin's regime with such forces. According to him, it is ironical that on one hand Russian forces were claiming to fight the "Ukronazis", on the other hand "the Russian state was cultivating its own homegrown Nazis"<sup>iv</sup>. In Russia, the rise of neo-Nazi skinheads coincided with the racist violence which shook the country in the 1990s. Once Putin came to power, he dealt with it in two ways: first, he used the neo-Nazi threat to justify his adaptation of anti-extremism legislation which was later used to target liberal, democratic voices in Russia. Second, he managed to mobilise the radical nationalist militants as a counterweight to an emerging anti-Putin coalition of democrats and left liberals. In fact, Putin used one such group of neo-Nazis called "Ruskii Obraz" to tackle his fierce opponent Alexei Navalny's efforts to build an anti-Putin coalition of like-minded people. As per the reports of Dr. Horvath, Putin's regime turned a blind eye towards atrocities committed by neo-Nazi leaders like Ilya Goryachev and Nikita Tikhinov. Apart from that, it also promoted people like Anna Trigga and Andrei Gulyutin who spearhead the online campaign for the Russian regime. Ann Trigga runs a trolling factory that was held responsible for interfering in the 2016 US presidential elections.

It is apparent from the discussions so far that the on-going war is fought at least on two planes. At one level it is fought on ground with weapons and mercenaries, at another level it is also a war of narratives. Data collected from more than 8,000 Russian websites containing nearly eight million articles about Ukraine since 2014 shows that references to Nazism were relatively flat for eight years and then spiked to unprecedented levels on Feb. 24, the day Russia invaded Ukraine. They have remained high ever since<sup>v</sup>. Likewise, social media data provided by Zignal Labs shows a spike in references to Nazism in Russian language tweets that matches the uptick in Russian news media<sup>vi</sup>. As a result, during the war, Russian citizens have echoed claims about Nazism in interviews, and in a poll published in May by the Levada Center, an independent Russian pollster, 74 % people expressed support for the war. This shows that the coming of digital age has made this narrative war more pervasive and perverse, both. These narratives are pervasive because they are seemingly coming from any nook and corner, and likewise, they are also percolating to faraway places, gathering mass, and thus some momentum amongst the far right extremist groups. At the same time, these narratives are also perverse because they are leading to more hatred, bigotry and anti-Semitic sentiments in the areas concerned and beyond. Attention must be paid to ways in which these narratives can be at least fact-checked for their veracity. Parallel to the negotiations taking place through various diplomatic channels, critical

questioning, and consequent, countering of the narratives fuelling propaganda must also be on the to-do list to alleviate the aggression.

---

## REFERENCE

*Leggewie, C. L.-K. (2014). Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung. Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt. München: C H Beck.*

Ripp, A. (2022, March 05). Ukraine's Nazi problem is real, even if Putin's 'denazification claim isn't. Retrieved September 25, 2024, from NBC News: <https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/ukraine-has-nazi-problem-vladimir-putin-s-denazification-claim-war-ncna1290946>

Horvath, D. R. (2022, March 23). La Trobe University. Retrieved September 25, 2024, from La Trobe University: <https://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2022/opinion/russias-long-history-of-neo-nazis>

Smart, C. (2022, July 02). The New York Times. Retrieved September 25, 2024, from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/07/02/world/europe/ukraine-nazis-russia-media.html>

## **India-México Partnership: Challenges and Barriers in its Relationship in BRICS**

**Juan Roberto Reyes Solís<sup>1</sup>**

Diplomatic relations between Mexico and India were established on August 1, 1950. It was the first country in the Latin American region to initiate these ties and therefore promote bilateral activities in different trends and perspectives. Both nations faced the different dynamics of the Cold War, the dispute between the great powers to attract them to their respective areas of influence. It has also been important that the two nations participated or approached relevant international political groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. At that time, Mexico and India acquired experience in the context of the international system, and their different dynamics, which allowed each one to acquire a prominent role in their respective geographic regions. Although Mexico opted for pacifism and the free self-determination of the people in multilateral forums, India did what corresponded within the framework of South Asia, as well as in the demands of the peoples who at the time required recognition and support from the world.

The two nations continued their own paths, faced challenges in their respective geographical regions. In the decade of 1980, they joined peace projects and continued to develop approaches that, although isolated, defined their profiles as leading countries. When the Cold War ended, new expectations arose. Mexico opted for the path of free trade but unfortunately experienced a severe economic crisis known as the "Tequila Crisis" in 1994. This crisis was triggered by the devaluation of the Mexican peso and was compounded by high inflation, a trade deficit, and political instability. The crisis motivated that the political leaders to take some drastic decisions and necessitated significant economic reforms and assistance from international financial institutions. On the other hand, India opted for economic modernization, but it faced difficulties in managing the transition from a protectionist economy to one that was more integrated into the global market. This involved addressing issues related to industrial policy, foreign investment, and regulatory changes.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the trends of both nations continued along the same path. It is important to mention that Mexico continued as a country aimed at strengthening its economic position, with a greater identity in North America, and at the same time with strong roots in the dynamics of Latin America. For its own way, India joined the BRICS route, along with China, Brazil, Russia and later South Africa. The situation at the current time is becoming promising. What awaits both countries within the framework of their current strategies and priorities? We will see this next.

---

<sup>1</sup> Professor, Universidad Anáhuac Querétaro, Mexico

### **Challenges for Mexico and India in their respective international roles.**

It is known that the last 24 years, the contemporary world is characterized by the emergence of several poles of power and among them, the one that corresponds to the great powers as the United States, is in the course of a multipolar dynamics (Western Europe, Japan, Russia, India and China) in which intermediate countries also stand out, with great capabilities and important signs of growth and economic development (Silva, 2013).

In these circumstances, New Delhi has established an *ad hoc* strategy to adapt to the international changes of this multipolar context. Indian diplomacy has created, through the BRICS an international interaction and economic cooperation (Devonshire-Ellis, 2024), a place to have greater visibility among nations and show its capacity for political dialogue. And according to its strategy, India has reached new horizons in the international system.

Its participation has also defined the rising of a new group of international powers in the world stage and it is recognized its origins the contribution to democratization of the international system and the support for developing countries in global governance. Up today it is understood that its influence and collaboration with different countries in diverse regions is a decisive action that promotes pragmatism among global powers (Juncal, 2017).

In the case of Mexico, even the cordiality and coincidences in political and global agenda, the ties with India are distant and the activities at BRICS are a kind of competition. It is very complicated for different reasons. For example, the economic and geopolitical competence with Brazil in Latin America, the position of neutrality in the case of Russia-Ukraine war and its implications in the relation with the United States, and finally the way China is seen as an external power in the region of North America. All these factors make difficult to approach to the BRICS agenda and rise as a barrier for fruitful activities.

Despite these conditions, the possibility of competition in commerce and investments in regional stages and in international politics makes BRICS and Mexico distant and this could be the source of possible tensions. It is important to consider that the economic policies and priorities of BRICS members vary significantly. As Brazil, Russia, and China have their own economic strategies and trade policies that may not always align with those of Mexico and India (Vázquez, 2016).

The BRICS countries are projected in the international environment as a group that could more strongly outline the international dynamics of the future. Therefore, the barriers that are seen due to geopolitical issues and also issues associated with the international strategy of governments could be overcome if both parties, Mexico and India, build an environment of greater institutional solidity.

An important contribution would have to do, if the step is taken, with the formation of special commissions related to bilateral activities, strengthening diplomacy, the ties between public and private actors, as well as civil society that enrich this vision. In addition to representing

a great challenge, the need for institutional rapprochement and other channels suggests evaluating the incorporation of such a diverse agenda in which all participants could agree but will have to evaluate the geopolitics and geoeconomics of our time.

These circumstances invite us to reflect on how Mexico should, in the present and the future, establish links with the BRICS countries to join, despite the competitive scenarios, to gain more presence in international politics and economy. The relationship between Mexico and India is very valuable and it will be necessary to analyze the conditions so that it is the door for greater rapprochement and better understanding with the BRICS countries.

## **Conclusions.**

What would the performance of Mexico and India be like if they were part of a group like the BRICS? Should Mexico join the BRICS to promote a more important multilateral agenda together with India and its allies? The possibilities of greater collaboration depend entirely on the national actors in each case, an issue that is perceived as very complicated for India and Mexico in the possibility of going together with the BRICS.

Both countries today have very different leadership profiles. On the one hand, Mexico has become associated with the geopolitical environment of North America and is subject to the trends that strongly prevail in the United States. Despite Mexico's leadership in different areas, it must be strengthened to project that it is a nation that leads different initiatives and that is seeking to deepen its participation on the international stage with a better face.

As far as India is concerned, regardless of its internal political challenges, the need to consolidate stability on the part of its national leaders will remain a priority. Only in this way will the Asian giant be able to not only move forward in the face of its national dynamics, but also maintain an active role on the international stage.

The future will define whether there is a meeting point that will allow bilateral ties to be united with greater strength. Possibly it will not be in the context of the BRICS, but surely, the role of Mexico and India in the context of world politics and economy will be decisive since both nations are destined to be great international leaders.

---

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Devonshire-Ellis, Chris (2024). India's trade and development with BRICS: Analysis and opportunities. India Briefing. Reviewed on August 8<sup>th</sup>, 2024 from <https://www.india-briefing.com/doing-business-guide/india/trade-relationships/india-s-trade-and-development-with-brics-analysis-and-opportunities>
- Juncal, Santiago Eduardo (2018). El bloque BRICS: ¿Instrumento para el desarrollo de países emergentes? Universidad Nacional de Sarmiento y Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina. Revista de Economía Crítica, n°25, primer semestre 2018.
- Silva Parada, Jacobo (2013). La India en los BRICS: una nueva forma de promover sus intereses en el escenario internacional. Revista Norteamérica, Año 8, número 2, julio-diciembre de 2013.

## State Vs Mind: Can Confucian Ideology Make China's Foreign Policy Richer?

Dr Suvro Parui<sup>1</sup>

As far as China's growth trajectory is concerned, west and the rest has observed a complex equation. However, the 'Chineseness' (中華性 Zhonghuaxing) is a prominent narrative of Chinese leadership in present scenario to understand the Chinese mind set. Although China's colossal material efficacies are always in situ with the parallel projection of its future growth. scholars and Sinologists always have the tendency of analysing the past from many respects. However, they tend to emphasize on the positive aspects of China, which offered them visibility in the international system. Highlighting China's economic dynamism, integration into the global economy it portrays the continuity of economic integration, and the interdependency between China and rest of the world increases.

For couple of decades, some orthodox theories coupled with Mao's ideology has served as the guiding principle for China and Chinese Communist party. Concepts like dialectical materialism, class struggle and proletarian dictatorship were in place for handling Chinese people for the realization of socialism. The legitimacy of CCP is also justified by its theories just to justify socialist movement; it monopolizes political power and other doctrines that contradicts its ideology. As a consequence, not only the so-called western ideologies were repudiated, but at the same time traditional ideologies like Confucianism are also marginalized. Interestingly, over last few decades the hegemony of Confucian ideology has remerged in China; first, it was socio-ideological significance of study Sinology, i.e. (guoxue re<sup>i</sup>); further, China's contemporary classics-reading movement has flourished significantly in China mainland and west. These have been around and throughout history, with varying content and intended for various individuals or social groups. The feeling of seeking for roots infers Confucian philosophy can be served for multiple needs and interests of China. That was the beginning of widespread revival of Confucianism.

Keeping the idea of Confucius in backdrop for diversity as an empirical reality under 'self-cultivation' and 'harmonious society' (**xiushen yu hexie shehui 修身与和谐社会**) in late 90s CCP leaders initiated the official operation of the Confucius classroom and the establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide. Basically, this '**xiushen yu hexie shehui 修身与和谐社会**' is the epistemological approach; not a mere theoretical issue, but also a practical one. The purpose of such a concept is for people to recognize their position, role and duties as members of society. Thus, self-cultivation allows for correctness of name and is the basis for positive relationships in the family and in society. That is, self-cultivation is the correct way to achieve greater harmony in reality and one of the solutions to socio-political problems. Without diversity there can be no harmony. In the process of proliferation of Confucianism, what comes to our mind that, is that a revival of Confucianism in main stream? However, the upturn of Confucianism is a phenomenon of the primary cultural tradition of Chinese civilization. During

---

<sup>1</sup> Assistant Professor, Amity University Haryana

post-Han period, Confucianism became one of the significant discourses, which brought legitimization of the ruling system for the emperor.

In fact, pre-modern China was basically a manifestation of Confucian ideology that was the guiding principle for administration ranging from government structure till day-to-day life. In 1911 imperialism came to an end, with the imperial catastrophe, and with the establishment of People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国 zhonghua renmin gong he guo<sup>ii</sup>) Confucianism became less effective all around. Hence, the resurgence of Confucianism was not a reaction to May Fourth ideology, which stated that China must seek new horizons of modernization, where science and democracy were given priority for the nation and emancipation from traditionalism itself.

### **Sculpturing Foreign Policy:**

In Chinese lens, the dynastic record of 'foreign policy' is fragmented under the topics like border control, frontier trade, imperial benevolence etc. Confucian philosophers pointed out that scholar-officials, farmers and artisans laboured with mind or muscle but merchants only moved things about with. Specially, it was the initiative of China's southern Sung (1127-1279), who were more interested on foreign trade between east and far east. This sea trade evoked to determine China's maritime policies, which later proliferated and transformed into China's domestic policy. Later the Han emperor had to acknowledge the egalitarian relationship and brought to acknowledge Confucian lessons as the necessity of bringing social order. It would appear that the influence of Confucian political thought on China has an embedded connection with political order and philosophers like Xunzi and Mencius in some way. Despite differences in their thought process, this article emphasizes the similarities. Confucian views the political community as an ethical society aimed at promoting morality<sup>iii</sup>. It defines the six 'W<sup>iv</sup>' for the welfare of the common people, who appears to be the logical continuation of their emphasis on virtue, and the idea that all persons are equally capable of becoming righteous.

Many people hold the belief that Confucian philosophy and traditional Chinese culture are somehow incorporated into China's diplomatic theory. Confucian standards are the unlimited treasury (core) of thoughts for Chinese political theorem. Confucianism has given shrewdness backing to China to fabricate communist global relations with Chinese qualities. The generous government of Confucius was of the opinion that China's true starting point was to follow the quiet course of events; a theoretical approach to diplomatic layout. According to J. Nye, the discovery of Chinese Foreign Policy is a cumulative approach of China's soft power model<sup>v</sup>. The diachronic review of Chinese foreign policy says that to understand the role of Confucius and Confucianism had a much-selected application in broad spectrum. It seems to have a direct connection between Confucian text and soft power under present Chinese foreign policy. Soft power in Chinese discourse is primality confined on China's domestic policy. Following Chinese scholars' discussion on soft power, Chinese leaders used culture as the main source of Chinese soft power building. Confucianism has resurged as a primary feature for Chinese culture exporting. The Chinese government has put a great deal of effort into exporting Chinese culture through Confucius Institutes worldwide and through various Chinese cultural events. In recent years, references to the term "soft power<sup>vi</sup>" have become widespread in China, and

people who study Chinese politics and international relations have analysed soft power concepts in their own understanding.

To be precise, the Chinese Govt has mainly focused on the traditional Confucian moral framework and the mandate of rules, which has allowed the Chinese government to work in securing their right to rule and enhance a more assertive approach (Foreign Policy) in abroad. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also utilized Confucian mandate, as their soft power to enhance their nationalist sentiments among the people; therefore, Confucianism has been served as the codifying ideology further secure CCP's right to rule. On the other hand, foreign policy of China talks about the various challenges of the contemporary time.

Moreover, beyond the domain of international relations, philosophy of Confucius has also influenced Chinese in many respects. It is an established fact that in the fields of foreign policy analysis and international relations, expression of ideas is always remains crucial to any changes in a nation's foreign policy. That is to say, a nation's politics and foreign policy would be heavily influenced not only by shifts in global politics at the moment, but also by its heritage and traditional ways of thinking. Thus, the foreign policy imperatives of China become viable with the current international system.

The analysis here, will demonstrate the influence of Confucianism on Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, and the gradual analysis will cover the recent arguments and the role of Confucianism behind the psyche of several leading contemporary leaders and thinkers. Moreover, China's foreign policy directions during post Tian'an men era apparently fails to fully clarify China's status in the world order. While discussing the changing pattern of China's foreign policy dynamics since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), we need to look at the historical junctures as well. Despite discourses on Chinese foreign policy and Confucian ideology, study says that history of China's foreign policy dynamics is mainly focused on: a) Regional Stability is required in shaping China's relations with rest of the world, b) maintaining the national identity and c) neighbourhood have added magnetism in china's foreign policy.

According to chronology of dynasties, warring state period has its own significance; eastern Chou started around 770 BC, this period was stamped not just for its conflict with savages and battle inside provinces of China. The best blend of (ethics of religious traditions) that dominated China's political structure up until the 20th century was introduced by Confucius during the same time period as his philosophy, which became known as Confucian doctrine. Over times Confucian philosophy keeps providing resolutions of numerous problems. Particularly, interpretation of Confucian strategy of safeguarding nation is a precursor of China's foreign policy that defines the Chinese style of diplomacy and establishes a connection between the Confucian notion and its advancement as far as the state-party decisions are concerned. Further it also reflects the viability in the practical actions of China in the domain of foreign policy.

The recent viability of the term "Confucianism", not merely illuminates the cultural institutions that work to spread Chinese culture and language worldwide, also demonstrate the question of

how Confucius schools promote Chinese leaders' hegemonic goals around the world today. Hence, the etymological meaning of foreign policy could be described as framework and its efficacy how the strategies used to spread the word about its national interest around the world. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is how a nation negotiates with other nations to meet its needs. Confucianism has had a significant impact on Chinese politics and foreign policy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used Confucianism to bolster nationalist sentiments among the people as rulers in Chinese history. Thus, in order to procreate a more assertive foreign policy and bolster the CCP's domestic rule, Confucianism has been used as the governing ideology. One could assert with conviction that Confucianism will continue to be China's primary source of modernization-related concepts.

### **Confucian perspective towards Global leadership**

While nurturing the relationship between Confucianism and China's strategic move in dealing its domestic and foreign affairs, it is required to look at the classical model of political leadership in classical Confucianism. That talks about the core values, virtues, and the relationships. The Conceptual reconstruction is used to create a new Confucian model with utility ethics and ethics of justice and righteousness in mind. The proponents of the Confucian matrix can demonstrate its features and effectiveness in political and economic leadership. In addition, it is a quest for a practical method for achieving the crucial transformation toward global power. As far as the new model is concerned with a normative harmonization process, it can be made even better in considering all of the fundamental human values and how humanity will evolve in the future.

However, the Confucian model offers a creative and practical approach to addressing the requirements of various levels of leadership, from management to global strategic capacity building. The creation and upholding of the new power politics model, on the other hand, greatly aids comprehension of the Confucian model in relation to contemporary Chinese political leadership and foreign policy. The notion of demotic belief that Confucians pacifism is established upon a modern Chinese myth, created in the early 20th century rather than a legitimate Confucian foreign policy tradition. Confucian foreign policy traditions were characterized with the juxtapose nature of inclusivism and exclusivism, neither of which gave up the use of force as statutory measures for foreign policy.

According to the 'Book of Change' (Yijing), traditional Chinese theory of human relationship and value served as the foundation for both traditions. Relational interactions in China's foreign relations were a possible outcome of the adoption of inclusivism or exclusivism in foreign policy<sup>vii</sup>. Affined interplay in China's foreign relation was an episodic outcome of the adoption of inclusivism or exclusivism in foreign policy. As reflected in the inclusive tradition, Confucianism's inclusive humanism may serve as a significant intellectual inspiration for Chinese foreign policy today. The Confucian grand strategy's inclusive relationism also significantly broadens the strategic vision of Chinese foreign policy. The discourse regarding Chinese foreign policy under President Xi Jinping already demonstrates a significant amount of inclusive relationism. By proponent of this strategy more into practice, both China and the world will be benefitted from multiple directions.

## China's foreign policy architecture 1949 onwards

Since the very founding of the PRC, Chinese leaders have spouted hawkish rhetoric and engaged in militant provocations at and beyond China's frontiers. While confrontational verbiage was more common when Mao Zedong—who dominated PRC domestic politics and foreign policy between 1949 and 1976—was alive, these pugnacious pronouncements have remained a part of Beijing's playbook in the post-Mao era<sup>viii</sup>. Again, the so-called Chinese People's Volunteer Army's widespread support for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea marked the beginning of the PRC's foreign policy goals toward the end of 1950. The changing trend of Maoist-era military strength continued until the first half of the post-Mao era. Like rulers in Chinese history, Confucianism is somehow incorporated into the framework of the communist party to quell nationalist sentiments among the populace; China's governing ideology is partially influenced by Confucianism's indoctrination, as is its increasingly assertive foreign policy and domestic policy. While discussing Confucianism and Chinese politics, the fact pops up that essence of Confucianism was vanished during Mao era in China mainland after CCP established its power in 1949. Technically in post Mao era, resurgence of Confucianism took place in China under the banner of 'Gai ge kai fang' (Opening and Reform). During the period of opening and reform era, China witnessed its rapid development in it political, economic strength. Thus, the quest of whether China can rise peacefully becomes a matter of concern toward its neighbourhood and the west. We know that China was very pragmatic on its initial development, and Deng's thinking was heavily influenced by the "virtue" philosophy. That set the tone for China's overall foreign policy and was one of the main reasons Confucianism came back in force in the mid-1990s; that allowed China to redefine its policy architecture, define the implications of Confucianism for democracy and western liberalism, and establish Confucianism as the dominant ideology in China. However, my approach here is to connect Confucian ideology with Chinese Foreign policy, with some basic arguments like can Confucianism make Chinese foreign policy richer? China has its rich history of cultural civilization. Confucianism is not just a school of thought; rather, it is a state of religion and sentiment. Confucianism is one of the pillars of Chinese civilization.

As far as the rapid economic development of China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is concerned, it seems that indoctrination of Confucianism has already in the Chinese policy system, which may be not visible openly. On the outset, one thing we must consider Confucian ideology as a typical ideology of China and enjoy privileges that no other system does. A few Confucian scholars argued that Confucianism must be understood and reshaped as a civic religion rather than a state of religion. Under a specific cultural consciousness China constitutes the foundation of its civic religion, in which its people can find the meaning of their existence. (Che 2013, 2016). As we know that the concept of nation-state does not fit for China, in Chinese lens, the dynastic record of 'foreign policy' is fragmented under the topics like border control, frontier trade, imperial benevolence etc. China's southern Sung (1127-1279) was more concerned with international trade between the east and the far east. China's maritime policies were influenced by this sea trade, which later evolved into the country's domestic policy. This sea trade evoked to determine/develop China's maritime policies, which later developed and transformed into

China's domestic policy. Later the Han emperor had to accept the egalitarian brother to brother relationship and brought to accept Confucian teachings as the basic of social order.

### **Foreign Policy with Chinese characteristics**

A new ability to evaluate Beijing's shift in policy discourse has been added by the western breakthrough on sinology. China pursued its alliance with two superpowers in the aftermath of western colonialization and freedom restoration in the middle of the 20th century. As Xunzi, the incomparable Confucian master attested: changes in international politics have largely been attributed to the political ideas of leaders, and that political power is important. As a result, the idea of leadership and Xunzi's concept of political power share many commonalities.


Departure from Deng's 'Tao Guang yang hui<sup>ix</sup>' to Xi's 'Xing xing', gives a and methodological shift of China's foreign policy frame work. In terms of China's foreign policy, this demonstrates how identical leadership emerges and how it shapes Chinese leaders' minds. China observed variations in the doctrine of concealing capabilities and waiting for the right time during its transit, but Deng has also supported "You suo zuo wei" (proactive and achieve success). Etymologically, the ideational leadership is derived from the perception of national leaders. However, 'ideational leadership' centers round 'leadership achieved with the help of ideas'. Thus, it is applied by the policy practitioners, according to requirement. Even though it is truly Confucian, the current call for "harmony" (he xie) in China is a socialist value. Moreover, China's quest on 'benevolence' (ren), is one of the key components of Confucianism. Even Xi Jinping's concept of a "world community of common destiny" has elements of classical philosophy. It is necessary to have a better understanding of the philosophical connotations of Xi's vision and mission for a Chinese international order in order to comprehend them, particularly Xi's and the CCP's obsession with Confucian thought.

This, in turn also requires understanding the context through which such came about, necessitating a dive into Chinese history. Understanding "heaven," the source of all human and social values, is essential to comprehending Confucian ideology. Although Chinese heaven is authoritarian, its goal is harmony and order rather than creation or destruction. Instead of establishing or destroying its purpose to maintain harmony and order, it appears that heaven in Chinese culture is more patronizing. Confucius advocated for a hierarchy that begins with the family because he did not see humans as separate entities. Therefore, the Chinese view superiority as the primacy of collective effort over individual effort in order to maintain social order. As far China's balance and power is concerned, indeed there are some links and yet juxtaposing relationship between 'Yin' and 'Yang', but balance of power is very much realist terminology. Whilst the west is fascinated by the wisdom of 'Art of war' also well informed of China's strategic culture of wo xin chang dan<sup>x</sup>. However, Confucianism also provides an ethical code of conduct and says that the right to power could be withdrawn from the Son of heaven if he failed to embrace and practice Confucian values that consist of Humanness, Righteousness, Knowledge, and Integrity. Under such scenario, there would be a change in dynasty until a new Tian zi emerged to uphold the moral values.

Incarnating Confucian model in Chinese society, Confucianism justified and rationalized inequality in the traditional Chinese tributary system under Heaven (Tian-xia). The concept of

Tian-xia could be viewed from three perspectives: Datong, homogeneity, and order (Qin 2010: 41-42). Therefore, holism asserts that there is no distinction between "I" and "we," or "self" and "other." Datong talks about harmony and widely refers to the trinity where human and nature, ideal and reality meet as a harmonious whole (Qin 2010:42)<sup>xi</sup>. Sharing the same Tian, the power of Tian Zi could occasionally extend beyond its geographical boundaries to include tributary states whose citizens ought to strive for Chinese culture based on Confucian principles in order to promote world harmony.

### Conceptual framework of the key tenants of Confucianism



### Conclusion

Confucianism indeed a large concept, for the purpose of understanding its role in China's foreign policy. This chapter marks that China failed to promote Confucian values, which led to opposition from local communities. However, despite this failure, Confucianism still has the potential to mobilize China's cooperation in a decolonial push away from Western hegemony. Instead, it ought to be acquired as a counterbalance that provides a means of elective improvement for developing and immature nations that are freed from the scourge of dependence. Last but not least, Confucianism could be used to describe the self-based moral universe or self that is based on goodness.

Therefore, according to Confucius, a ruler must establish trust for 'there is no way to establish oneself without trust from people' (论语Lunyu12:7)<sup>xii</sup>. Further a step ahead, maintain harmony within is the first step of bringing stability and peace. This is the fundamental difference in western concept of enforcement through rule of law and punishment (Yue 2014)<sup>xiii</sup>. China's military and economic power have trembled its neighbours, leading to fear that rise of China could dismantle international peace. However, soft power never allows to take weapon. As far as Confucian values are concerned, it embraces unity and righteousness and achieve harmony all around is its ultimate goal. But the question of whether Confucianism has an iota of guiding state behaviour that is important. Quavering with Cheng's view, reviving Confucianism as a moral -political philosophy and by incorporating the moral values into Chinese Foreign policy has the potential to make Chinese foreign policy richer.

---

## NOTES

<sup>i</sup> Chinese national learning (A movement in contemporary China and the issues surrounding it.)

<sup>ii</sup> Chinese use this term for PRC.

<sup>iii</sup> Low, K.C.P. Confucian Ethics. In: Idowu, S.O., Capaldi, N., Zu, L., Gupta, A.D. (eds) Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 2013. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8\\_594](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_594)

<sup>iv</sup> Who, What, Where, How, Why, When are termed as 'W'.

<sup>v</sup> Joseph Nye. Soft power: The origins and political progress of a concept.

<sup>vi</sup> Soft power, coined by American scholar Joseph S. Nye in the early nineties, has been widely used in the academic and political arenas. According to Nye, the power a state exercises can be divided into two categories: hard power, referring to military and economic power; and soft power, indicating the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion.

<sup>vii</sup> Lu DP. Influence of I-ching (Yijing, or The Book Of Changes) on Chinese medicine, philosophy and science.

<sup>viii</sup> Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975; and Andrew Scobell, "Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China's Peaceful Rise?" Parameters, Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 2009, pp. 4–22.

<sup>ix</sup> Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy doctrine—to calmly observe, hold one's ground, react firmly, act but keep a low profile

<sup>x</sup> which means enduring self-imposed hardship in order to strengthen and prepare the resolve of a person to realize his ambition.

<sup>xixixi</sup> Yue, R.Wk. Beyond dependency: the promise of Confucianism in Post-Westphalia International relations. *Bandung J of Global South* 2, 4 (2015).

<sup>xii</sup> Hunter, Michael: Confucius Beyond the Analects, Brill, Leiden. 2017

<sup>xiii</sup> Hinton, David: Analects, Confucius. Counterpoint, Berkeley. 2014

## India-Brazil Ties: Before the BRICS and Onwards

Dr. Rishu Sharma<sup>1</sup>

It can be stated with little doubt that two significant moments in world history, one in 1498 and another in 1500, changed the world forever. European colonial expansion took a head start with the discovery of India and Brazil and reshaped global trade and commerce.

When Pedro Álvares Cabral left Portugal for India, the most coveted part of the world at the time, he barely had any idea that he would land in what would later be known as the “lungs of the planet.” Even after he discovered Brazil, he remained unaware that he had come across a land three times the size of India and much more diverse in terms of nature and resources. While the Portuguese, abiding by the Treaty of Tordesillas, remained limited to the Amazon regions, leaving the Spaniards to govern other parts of Latin America, in the Indian subcontinent, they did attempt to expand. Brazil gained its independence during the event known as **Grito de Ipiranga** on September 7, 1822. Since then, Brazil began exploring ways to strengthen ties with the Western world and establish a global footprint. On the other hand, as the first Europeans in India, the Portuguese were also the last to leave. India gained its independence in 1947, but the Portuguese continued to hold on to Goa. Brazil was the first Latin American country to recognize the independence of India, and both nations established diplomatic relations in 1948.

In 1961, when India sought to liberate Goa, Brazil had already carved its own foreign policy, independent of Portuguese influence. As a former colony of Portugal, Brazil took a neutral stance in the Goa crisis. Brazil's foreign policy sought cooperation with Western powers, and therefore, Brazil remained neutral in international forums. In the United Nations, Brazil did not approve of India's military intervention in Goa. However, Brazil also ensured that it did not endorse Portuguese territorial claims to Goa. This strong neutrality earned Brazil considerable praise.

Brazil continued fostering meaningful relations with India. Both nations became some of the strongest members of the Non-Aligned Movement. They kept carving their foreign policies, steering clear of aligning with either of the two Cold War powers. At the same time, both India's and Brazil's ties with Britain and Portugal remained intact. India opened its economy in 1992, and her liberalization programme opened doors for other economies to venture into the immensely large Indian market. Brazil, too, began making significant economic gains from 1992 onwards, and it also implemented policies to liberalize its economy. The two countries, with their state-led economic programmes, began progressing in their respective hemispheres. Trade and cultural relations gradually strengthened as the two countries grew as economic powerhouses. High-level visits from dignitaries on both sides paved the way for cooperation not only in trade but also in culture and education.

---

<sup>1</sup> Assistant Professor, Amity University Haryana

In 2001, economist Jim O'Neill, working at Goldman Sachs, first introduced the concept of BRIC. Later, it became clear that Brazil, India, China, and Russia were indeed countries continuously contributing to global GDP. The idea of a common forum for these emerging countries was formalized in 2009 when the bloc held its first official summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, under the name BRIC, with South Africa joining later to make it BRICS. There has been no looking back since. Though one cannot ignore the fact that tense and rather unstable ties between China and India might be seen as an impediment to intense mutually beneficial activities among the member nations, both China and India have done well to sustain and grow BRICS as an organization. Brazil, with its strong trade and cultural ties, has managed to balance relations with both China and India, without meddling in their affairs. BRICS has grown considerably in impact and strength over the last few years, with many countries showing interest in joining the organization.

The importance of Brazil and India within BRICS can be plainly understood by the fact that Russia has proposed both India and Brazil as key countries to mediate in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. Though neither Brazil nor India has directly intervened in the matter, they have strongly advocated for peace and dialogue. Both countries have resisted pressure from Western nations to align their policies with Western interests in the conflict.

Recently, Brazil called for a joint currency, similar to the Euro, for BRICS countries. While India's current focus is on conducting more trade in the national currencies of BRICS nations, there is a strong possibility that, if such a currency project is pursued, India might join, which would elevate ties between the two countries to a new level.

Brazil, undoubtedly positioning itself to be one of the world's superpowers both economically and politically, cannot be ignored in global affairs. While India leads the world in terms of trade and commerce as one of the fastest-growing major economies, Brazil's contributions to the world in the fields of agriculture and environmental conservation are indisputable. It is clear that as Brazil and India continue to grow and expand economically and politically, their paths will keep crossing. A cordial and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries will lead to a better and more stable world in the future, as both nations are bound to be future global leaders. Both Brazil and India have sought permanent seats on the UN Security Council but have never opposed each other's candidature. Both nations have acted responsibly and actively pushed for reforms in the UN.

The vast geographical distance between the two countries has played a major role in limiting connections. Trade and movement of people have always been difficult due to the geographical barriers that separate them. However, India's growing passion for global sports like football has made it easier for ordinary Indians to identify Brazil on the world map. In many cities across India today, one can easily find people wearing Brazilian national football T-shirts. Likewise, Indian religion and culture, and Mahatma Gandhi's message of peace, have been warmly received in Brazil, as they have in many former European colonies. Hindu temples and yoga schools have sprung up in major cities of Brazil, and the general Brazilian population today is relatively aware of India's ancient health systems.

As both Brazil and India continue to rise on the global stage, the ties between the two countries will play an increasingly important role in shaping a more balanced and stable world order. Their shared history, mutual respect, and common goals in global forums like BRICS and the UN will ensure that their relationship continues to flourish. As they both strive to become future global leaders, their cooperation will not only benefit their respective economies but also contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous world.

---

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pinheiro Guimarães, S. (2020). *Brazil-India relations: Beyond the 70 years*. FUNAG. Retrieved from <https://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/1015-Brazil-India-relations-beyond-the-70-years.pdf>

ORF. (n.d.). *India and Brazil in the global multilateral order*. Retrieved November 1, 2024, from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-brazil-in-the-global-multilateral-order>

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (n.d.). *Bilateral documents*. Retrieved November 1, 2024, from <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm>

Brazilian Government. (2024, August). Brazil and India strengthen trade relations in recent years. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2024/08/brazil-and-india-strengthen-trade-relations-in-recent-years>

Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *India and Brazil: Trade relations*. Retrieved November 1, 2024, from <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ind/partner/bra>

Bricsington, J. (2023). *Brics: A deep analysis of the five emerging powers - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa - and their impact on the global future*

## **Evaluation of BRICS' Stance on Climate Change, Sustainable Development and Environmental Cooperation**

Dr Luxita Sharma<sup>1</sup>

India, China, Brazil, and Russia make up the acronym BRIC, which was created in 2001 by Goldman Sachs researchers. That applied to four nations at the time; in April 2011, South Africa became a member of the group. These countries' tremendous economic potential is causing them to quickly emerge as major players in the global economy (Slobodníková, O., & Nagyová, R. 2011). The intergovernmental organization known as BRICS, which is made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates as new members on January 1, 2024. At its August 2023 summit in Johannesburg, the group decided to allow new members, which sparked discussion about its expanding global power. Estimates indicate that the organization, known colloquially as BRICS+ since its growth, currently contributes 37.3% of global GDP, which is more than half that of the EU (14.5%). A consensus on shared political ideas may be more challenging to achieve as a result of the new members' propensity to introduce possible conflicts (such as Saudi Arabia/Iran or Egypt/Ethiopia) in addition to their increased economic power. The expansion's significance should be understood beyond its purely economic impact, as the new members will only make up about 4% of the group's total GDP. Instead, it will give the group and developing nations more clout in international organizations like the UN, WTO, and Bretton Woods institutions (Marc, 2024).

The emergence of the BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has generated significant discourse in the realm of global geopolitics, upending established power hierarchies and transforming the nature of international interactions. There is no doubting the evidence that a small number of Western powers have long dominated the conventional understanding of global power. But the economic might of the BRICS nations has changed this story, launching them into the global arena as powerful forces with enormous financial, political, and geopolitical significance. This debate delves into the intricate relationships between geopolitical factors, diplomatic activities, and the eventual goal of a fairer allocation of power, even though economic growth is a critical starting point (Uzoma et al., 2024).

A key element of the BRICS members' goal for a multipolar world order is "soft power," or the capacity to influence people via appeal and persuasion rather opposed to force. While military and economic might are vital, so is the capacity to shape narratives, encourage cross-cultural engagement, and forge alliances through diplomatic means (Tella., 2017). China has demonstrated proficiency in the application of soft power with the establishment of programs like the Confucius Institutes, that promote Chinese language and culture globally. Similarly, India may demonstrate soft power through its cultural festivals, yoga diplomacy, and booming film industry. Russia's strong literary and creative traditions continue to serve as the foundation for soft power, while Brazil's cultural exports, particularly music and sports, expand its

---

<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor and Head of Department of Dietetics and Applied Nutrition, Amity University, Haryana,

influence globally. The BRICS countries' combined efforts to promote intellectual cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, and cultural exchanges strengthen their soft power. The BRICS countries aspire to broaden their global influence and contribute to the multifaceted world they envision by offering an alternative viewpoint to the Western-centric one (Arif, 2017).

Within the BRICS group, there is a relationship between financial openness, international trade dynamics, and the strictness of environmental policies from 1996 to 2021. Empirical results challenge conventional thinking by focusing on crucial variables like technological innovation and economic growth. Remarkably, we discovered that strict environmental regulations by themselves do not always result in lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The expected moderating effect of business and foreign direct investment-driven environmental policy stringency on environmental well-being does not materialize; on the contrary, both of these moderating channels show unexpected favourable associations with CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The existence of a "pollution haven" phenomena within the economies of the BRICS nations is one of the disclosures that provokes us. Research indicates that trade and foreign direct investment appear to be associated with higher emission levels when looked at separately. These results offer an explicit answer to our research conundrum and highlight the essential need for innovative and strong environmental legislation. These regulations need to be strong enough to mitigate the negative environmental effects that result from the combination of international trade and monetary integration. By doing this, they will advance the BRICS countries toward a future based on ecological integrity and sustainability (Mahalik et al., 2024).

## **BRICS STAND ON CLIMATE CHANGE**

As we see an increase in catastrophic natural catastrophes and notable shifts in global temperatures, it is becoming more and more clear that climate change needs to be addressed immediately. This extensive study uses a dual method that includes both theoretical and statistical aspects—basic and extra analysis—to critically evaluate the compliance to climate targets outlined at COP26 and COP27. Theoretical results show that despite their combined efforts, China, Brazil, and South Africa continue to report a rise in climate change indices. Notably, Brazil's efforts to finance green projects have made only modest headway (Jan et al., 2024).

The problem of climate change is relatively new. The discussions, which centred mostly on the 1970s<sup>3</sup>, made clear how important it is to take into account the relationships that exist between nature and society, the environment and human growth, and the long-term viability of our production-consumption paradigm for future generations. Therefore, it is challenging to address these subjects without mentioning the initiatives taken to create a general knowledge base regarding such connections. We consider climate change to be a social, economic, and security concern in addition to an environmental one (Barros-Platiau., 2010).

In 1997, at the third session of the COPs, negotiations took place on the Kyoto Protocol (KP). In general, the Protocol set forth a number of objectives and pledges that presented distinct GHG reductions for every nation. It is recommended that the Annex I group cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 5% between 2008 and 2012 compared to 1990. Nonetheless, no legally

enforceable commitment was established for the non-annex I, or more specifically, the developing nations<sup>11</sup>. The KP was put off until a later term in 2009 due to the lack of agreement on a model to use. Even at COP 15, where some agreements were anticipated, the post-Kyoto discussions once more stalled. Furthermore, the BRICS nations were heavily involved in that regard, as they adopted voluntary emission reduction objectives under the Accord even in the absence of required pledges (Rinaldi. & Martuscelli., 2016).

At COP 15, in 2009, they declared that they would voluntary (as opposed to mandatory) reduce their respective emissions within their own boundaries by implementing some quantifiable, mid-term targets. Accordingly, Brazil promised to cut its national output by 36-39% by 2020 compared to "business as usual" levels. China declared that by 2020, it would cut its emissions relative to GDP to 40–45% (the range that was deemed the baseline in 2005). Russia declared that it will cut its share from the 1990s by 10–25%. Lastly, India promised to cut its emissions by 20–25% by 2020 (using the same baseline from 2005) in relation to GDP (Hurrell. & Sengupta., 2012). Under the "business as usual" baseline, South Africa has pledged to reducing the production of greenhouse gases by 34% by 2020 to 42% by 2025.

The primary goal of the BRICS countries' climate change policies is economic growth. This makes it a unique feature. Their efforts to reduce emissions are therefore dependent on the primary objective of development. They are only acting in sectors where doing so would not interfere with their economic trajectory. That helps to explain the pledges' modest characteristics, at least in part. The BRICS nations demonstrated a clear division over their respective policies, particularly with regard to climate change. It appears doubtful that the group will continue to play an important position in climate negotiations in the absence of consensus on that basic issue (Rinaldi. & Martuscelli., 2016).

## **SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN BRICS COUNTRIES THROUGH GREEN GROWTH**

The BRICS nations have an abundance of cheap labour, copious natural resources, and cutting-edge technical advancements. Brazil, Russia, and South Africa primarily rely on mineral resources because they are rich in these resources and export their goods to other countries, whereas China and India depend on labour-intensive products because their large populations encourage low-cost production. Brazil has a wealth of agricultural resources as well. Brazil has abundant hydroelectric resources and energy reserves that have generated clean energy in recent years, but because of the nation's lax environmental safety regulations, the country faces significant criticism from international groups and the media (Freitas et al., 2012). Approximately 90% of the nation's electricity needs are met by hydropower.

India, which has the fifth-largest wind industry in the world, plans to upgrade its solar energy base to a 20 GW capacity by 2022. India's rural energy dilemma, where energy transfers remain a major challenge, would be resolved with the aid of the solar energy foundation. The aforementioned conversation highlights the significance of green growth within the framework of the BRICS countries. Specifically, the policies pertaining to the environmentally friendly economy and sustainable policy objectives serve as a wake-up call for policy makers and

environmentalists, encouraging them to craft policies that protect the environment and prioritize investments in sources of clean energy for the region (Zaman et al., 2016). The research carried out in the BRICS nations is unlikely to hold the same weight in emerging nations outside of the group as well as in industrialized nations, which have very different circumstances. The researchers are expected to carry out comparable studies in developed and poor nations across the globe. This study examines the contribution of the country's ESG score, GDP growth, FDI, NNI, and inflation to the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) between 1991 and 2020 (Hieu & Hai., 2023).

## CONCLUSION

Business management creates policies to achieve an optimal working atmosphere for workers, the well-being of all parties involved, and competitive business advantages when it acknowledges its responsibility for the quality of the environment, the social well-being of all parties involved, and the business itself. Better overall social, environmental, and economic results follow, and these are the main pillars around that the SDGs are constructed. The BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—are developing nations with varying rates of growth, comparable but distinct social and environmental traits, and unique economic circumstances. The research carried out in the BRICS nations is unlikely to hold the same weight in emerging nations outside of the group as well as in industrialized nations, which have very different circumstances. The researchers are expected to carry out comparable studies in developed and poor nations across the globe. This study examines the contribution of the country's ESG score, GDP growth, FDI, NNI, and inflation to the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) between 1991 and 2020.

---

## ENDNOTES

Slobodníková, O., & Nagyová, R. (2011). Global influence of the BRIC countries. In *The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually In The 21st Century Conference*.

Marc, J. U. T. T. E. N. (2024). *Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?*.

Uzoma, O. M., Chibuzor, O. D., Obi, R. E., Oluwafemi, B. K., Mary-Cynthia, C. G., Offorah, C. B., ... & Oluwatosin, A. Beyond Economic Growth: BRICS as an Emerging Power and the Search for a Multipolar World Order. *interactions*, 5, 6.

Tella, O. (2017). South Africa in BRICS: The regional power's soft power and soft balancing. *Politikon*, 44(3), 387-403.

Arif, B. H. (2017). The Role of Soft Power in China's Foreign Policy in the 21th Century. *International Journal of Social Sciences & Educational Studies*, 3(3), 94.

Mahalik, M. K., Pal, S., Le, T. H., & Mishra, S. (2024). Does environmental policy stringency improve nature's health in BRICS economies? Implications for sustainable development. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 31(1), 509-528.

Jan, D., Ahmad, M., & Gu, X. (2024). Understanding the complex dynamics of climate change in BRICS countries: Analyzing the COP26 and COP27 agendas. *Energy & Environment*, 0958305X241251414.

Barros-Plataiu, A. F. (2010). When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53, 73-90.

Rinaldi, A. L., & Martuscelli, P. N. (2016). The BRICS on climate change global governance. *Meridiano 47-Journal of Global Studies*, 17.

Hurrell, A., & Sengupta, S. (2012). Emerging powers, North–South relations and global climate politics. *International Affairs*, 88(3), 463-484.

Zaman, K., bin Abdullah, A., Khan, A., bin Mohd Nasir, M. R., Hamzah, T. A. A. T., & Hussain, S. (2016). Dynamic linkages among energy consumption, environment, health and wealth in BRICS countries: green growth key to sustainable development. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 56, 1263-1271.

Freitas, I. M. B., Dantas, E., & Iizuka, M. (2012). The Kyoto mechanisms and the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in the BRICS. *Energy Policy*, 42, 118-128.

Hieu, V. M., & Hai, N. T. (2023). The role of environmental, social, and governance responsibilities and economic development on achieving the SDGs: evidence from BRICS countries. *Economic research-Ekonomska istraživanja*, 36(1), 1338-1360.

## EXPERT INTERVIEW

The famous polish Indologist Dr. Krzysztof Iwanek (KI) spoke with Dr. Mansi (KM) to share his views on BRICS and India's role in it. Dr. Iwanek is India Coordinator at Institute for Eastern Studies, Poland. He is also an Associate Research Fellow at Institute of Security and Defence Policy, Sweden. Dr. Iwanek has authored two books on India. He frequently visits India and has appeared in various Indian news outlets as well. He also writes for *The Diplomat* and other media outlets.



**KM: What is your assessment of BRICS expansion? Do you think BRICS expansion will dilute the mandate of founding members?**

**KI:** If BRICS is to remain focused on politically neutral economic issues, its expansion won't dilute its founding members' mandate. However, if BRICS is to have common national security interests, its expansion will dilute this objective. A common national security interest for Russia and China would naturally be rivalry with the US, and that's something India wouldn't be on board with. But it's not only about India. I think an alliance against the US as such may be formed one day. I find it very likely that it will be led by China and Russia. I find it very likely that a country like Iran or North Korea could be a part of it. But BRICS can't serve this role. I don't think Brazil would like to be in it, or South Africa. And perhaps it's no surprise that Saudi Arabia, one of the US' main partners in the Middle East, is apparently still considering whether to join BRICS.

Something similar happened to the SCO, I assume - the organization could have been united by a common anti-US agenda but expanding it diluted this objective. But the fact that the SCO didn't become an anti-US alliance, and the fact that BRICS too can't become such an alliance, doesn't have to mean that another platform can't be created to form it. In the meantime, BRICS, I assume, will remain mostly focused on economy.

**KM: Do you see BRICS as an alternative to the US led institutional (monetary and political) system?**

**KI:** Not in the foreseeable future. There is a lot of talk about this, but the truth seems to be that there are little results. For instance, there was recently a lot of speculation about a common BRICS currency, an alternative to the US dollar, but I don't see this confirmed anywhere: what is that currency? Who is introducing it and to be used where? BRICS economies like India remain very intertwined with the Western banking system, would-be BRICS economies, like that of Saudi Arabia, are also economically tied to the US. Again, it doesn't have to mean that

such an alternative is not possible - it's just that it seems much further away than the Russians and the Chinese would like to admit.

**KM: What is your view of the impact of India-China bilateral relationship on the overall functioning of BRICS?**

**KI:** Firstly, as mentioned before, I think India and China share no national security interest. More than that, as it is widely known, their national security interests clash with each other. This remains one of the main reasons why BRICS can't become an alliance, although, as stated above, I don't think South Africa or Brazil would like to be in such an alliance too. As Sino-Indian relations are growing worse, not better, it may be even puzzling why India is in BRICS at all. But I think New Delhi's calculus here is more and less this: (a) Being in BRICS is also about keeping good relations with other countries, such as Russia, even at the cost of being in one organization with China; (b) It looks good for India's foreign policy narrative, because New Delhi doesn't want to be seen as being in alliance with the West (or with Russia, for that matter). (c) As long as such a multilateral organization that brings together India and China is mostly focused on economy, and thus not seen as political, and if such an organization is not clearly dominated by China, India is still open to such form of multilateral, politically neutral cooperation with China. After all, India is in the AIIB and is actually one of the main recipients of AIIB loans, even though the primary force behind the establishment of AIIB was China.

**KM: Do you think BRICS currency can become a reality? What are the major hurdles as per your assessment?**

**KI:** I have partially replied to this regarding other questions already. I think this is a long way ahead. All the recent talk about a BRICS currency, when checked carefully, seems to be gossip originating from sources such as the Russian embassy in South Africa. Contrary to what was reported in some sources, the recent BRICS summit in Johannesburg didn't declare a plan to establish such a currency. What the declaration said was stressing the significance of national currencies (of BRICS countries) in the international trade. Also, the BRICS's bank, the New Development Bank, declared that 30% of its loans would be in national currencies. But other than that, let us remember that even the New Development Bank uses the USD as its currency.

And as long as there is no such thing as a BRICS currency - and let me stress again that it's not being even created and we don't know if it ever will be - the other option would be to promote one of the BRICS countries' currencies to make it play a larger role in international exchange. And then the question arises: whose? While I understand that there are countries (and some other entities) which are unhappy with the dominance of the US dollar, I don't think they would like to swap it for a new kind of dominance. I assume the Chinese would be happy to make their currency a rival of the USD in this regard, but would India like to be as dependent on the PRC yuan as dollar in its international trade?

**KM: Do you think European countries like France should join BRICS?**

Short reply would be - no, because of Russia. And China too, but to a comparatively smaller degree: Russia would be the main reason.

To give a slightly longer reply: again, this boils down to the first question. Is BRICS to pursue common national security interests only? If so, then hardly any European country would be

interested, since that would also imply sharing such interests with Russia and China (and now also with a new BRICS entrant, Iran). Perhaps the current Hungarian government could wish to be a part of BRICS, perhaps the Serbian one, but there wouldn't be many more takers beyond that.

But if BRICS is to evolve towards neutral economic cooperation, then I think there would have been a chance to have European countries there (should they be invited), if it hadn't been for Russia's aggressive behaviour. Let me return to the case of AIIB. Many European countries joined the AIIB, including Poland, even though it was clear that AIIB is being created mainly by China (Russia is also part of the AIIB but is seemingly not as important in the organization as the PRC). But AIIB was seen as politically neutral and European member states assumed that it was still fine to join it even in the face of growing US-China rivalry. But BRICS has both Russia and China as key components, and that's too much of a heavy, negative political combination for most European states. Especially because of Russian behavior towards Ukraine: first the partial invasion of 2014, then the full one of 2022. Especially since 2022, most of Europe wants to show that a majority (not all) of our ties with Russia have been cut and thus wouldn't like to join an organization where Russia plays a pivotal role. Had the AIIB been formed now, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and not before, and had it had Russia as its member even in such a scenario, as it has now, then I think many European countries wouldn't have joined the AIIB.

---

## Author's Biography



Dr. Hugh Tuckfield is Director of Indo-Pacific Studies Centre, Australia. He also serves at the Advisory Board of Amity Centre for BRICS Studies.



Mr. Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, based in New Delhi, India. Holder of Charpak Scholarship, Government of France, he is currently pursuing his Doctoral study from JNU.




Mr. Otabek Khomidov is a Teaching Associate of Russian language at Amity University Haryana. He graduated from Osmania University in Hyderabad, India, and completed foundational studies at the Academic Lyceum of Telecommunication Technology in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.



Mr. Aniket Vaibhav is an Assistant Professor of German at Amity University Haryana. He is also a doctoral candidate at JNU. He has presented his research papers at various national and international conferences held in India and abroad and also published in peer-reviewed journals.



Dr S Parui is an Associate Professor of Chinese Language at Amity School of Languages, Amity University Haryana. He previously held a position of Senior Fellow at Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), New Delhi.



Dr. Juan Roberto Reyes Solís is Professor of Political Economy for International Commerce and International Security at the Universidad Anáhuac Querétaro, Mexico.



Dr. Luxita Sharma is an Associate Professor and Head of Department of Dietetics and Applied Nutrition, Amity University, Haryana, India. She is Fellow Member of Eudoxia Research University, USA and Executive Director (Hon.) of the Hindustan Agricultural Research Welfare Society.



Dr. Rishu Sharma is an Assistant Professor of Spanish at Amity University Haryana. He holds a Ph.D. in Indigenismo (Latin America) from Jawaharlal Nehru University, with research conducted at the Free University of Berlin, Germany.



**AMITY**  
UNIVERSITY  
— GURUGRAM —

Amity University, Amity Education Valley, Manesar, Gurugram-122413 (Haryana, India)

Amity Gurugram Helpline: 7303-399-399 | Website: [www.amity.edu/gurugram](http://www.amity.edu/gurugram)

Email: [admissions@ggn.amity.edu](mailto:admissions@ggn.amity.edu)

For Application form scan the QR Code



Stay Connected on Social Media:

[f](#) /Amityuniversitygurgaon | [i](#) /amityunigurugram\_official | [t](#) /AmityGurgaon  
[in](#) /AMITY University Gurgaon